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ABSTRACT 
The purpose of this thesis is to tell the untold story of the ascendance of Mexican 
DTOs over the production and distribution of methamphetamine. By adding this 
dimension to a story that has typically focused on the role of Mexican DTOs in the 
cocaine trade, it explains the spread of meth use in the U.S. and the challenges currently 
facing U.S. law enforcement officials attempting to combat the illegal methamphetamine 
trade. It concludes that the trick is to formulate international anti-drug policy that 
incorporates the “balloon effect” and anticipates the creation of a new challenge even as 
the old one is being laid low. If nothing else, the untold story of how the Mexican cartels 
rose to monopolize the methamphetamine trade in the United States demonstrates that the 
formulation of anti-drug policy needs to bridge the gap between tactical success and 
strategic failure. Drug lords come and drug lords go but the war on drugs goes on. If real 
progress is to be made, then the specifics, such as the story of how the Mexican DTOs 
took over the methamphetamine trade needs to be told and retold and integrated into the 
broader anti-drug policy initiative of the day. 
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This thesis examines the dominant role of Mexican drug trafficking organizations 
(DTOs) in the multi-billion dollar trade in illegal narcotics between Latin America and 
the United States since 1995. It assesses the implications of the existence and operation 
of the four major and thriving, Mexico cartels (or DTOs) for both the United States and 
Mexico. The story of Mexico’s rise to prominence by the mid- to late-1990s as the 
primary transshipment route for cocaine entering the United States is well known. 
However, much less attention has been devoted to how the Mexican cartels, which now 
control 80 % percent of all illegal drug trafficking into the United States, have become 
the primary producer and trafficker of methamphetamine for the American market in the 
past decade. 
A. PURPOSE 
This thesis focuses on the hitherto untold story of the rise of the Mexican cartels 
and their contemporary monopoly of the methamphetamine trade into the United States. 
The production and use of methamphetamine was primarily an American problem from 
the 1950s to the mid-1980s. Over the past fifteen years, as this thesis shows, Mexican-
based DTOs have come to dominate both the cocaine and methamphetamine trade. One 
of the many contradictions of the war on drugs is that the current monopolization of 
illegal drug trafficking in the Americas by the Mexican cartels was facilitated by the 
focus of U.S. international drug control policy on “source countries” (Bolivia, Peru and 
especially Colombia). Their current dominance of the methamphetamine trade meanwhile 
is a direct result of the success of American law enforcement efforts against “mom and 
pop” meth labs inside the United States. By utilizing their cocaine networks, the Mexican 







The illegal drug trade between Mexico and the United States has caused countless 
deaths, contributed to the misery of millions of Americans, Mexicans and their families, 
corrupted government and police officials on both sides of the border, and helped wear 
down or shred the social fabric of both countries. The illegal drug trade that Mexican 
based cartels or DTOs now control earns an estimated USD$ 150 billion dollars a year.1. 
With this amount of money at stake, violence and corruption has become pervasive in 
northern Mexico, particularly in those cities and states that are the primary entry points 
for illegal drugs into the United States.2 Human rights violations have emerged due to 
“cartel wars”. The increased flow of illegal aliens into the U.S. can also be attributed in 
part to either a desire to flee the violence in the region or the fact that they are working as 
“mules” for the DTOs.3 
Mexican DTOs are now responsible for the importation of 70 to 80 percent (and 
possibly even more) of all illegal drugs consumed in the United States. They exert 
increasing control over illegal drug trafficking within U.S. borders, while the Mexican 
border cities and states are completely dominated by the Mexican cartels.4 Mexico-U.S. 
border towns are major staging areas and transit points for illegal drug shipments. Police 
corruption and the co-optation and outright “ownership” of municipal and state 
government officials and politicians are on the rise. Human rights violations, violence 
and murder have increased dramatically in the border region in particular. However, this 
is only the tip of the iceberg in relation to Mexico’s increased role in the illegal drug 
trade. 
                                                 
1 U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center. National Drug Threat Assessment 
2007. December 2006. http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs21/21137/dtos.htm (accessed on 1 March 2007). 
2 William C. Prillaman. “Crime, Democracy, and Development in Latin America”, CSIS: Policy 
Papers on the Americas XIV, Study 6, June 2003. 11. 
3 U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Judiciary. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and Illegal 
Immigration Control Act 2005. 109th Congress 2006. 109-345. 
 
4 U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center: National Drug Threat Assessment 
2008. October 2007. http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/sumary.htm#Top (accessed on March 2 
2008). 
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This thesis argues that the four main Mexican cartels have increased their power 
significantly as they have expanded their role in both the cocaine and methamphetamine 
trades over the past decade. This has a number of implications for both the U.S. and 
Mexico. First, with billions of dollars available for police and political corruption, 
Mexican DTOs are increasingly able to function as “States within a State”. This is a 
situation that was, ironically made easier following Mexico’s transition from one party-
rule under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) to greater democracy, 
symbolized by the fact that for 71 years prior to 2000, the president had always been PRI. 
Second, the violence between the DTOs, coupled with Mexico’s inability to effectively 
deter the cartels and the pervasive police corruption that is a key element in their day-to-
day operations has made the “rule of law” in many areas of northern Mexico irrelevant. 
The inability of the Mexican government to control the DTOs is a testament to the loss of 
its authority. Third, with a steady increase in Mexican DTOs operating effective and 
complicated distribution networks in the U.S., the ability of U.S. law enforcement 
personnel to deter illegal drug sales has been greatly reduced. This has in turn, only 
enhanced the power of the Mexican cartels further, and allowed them to increase the 
revenues they accrue from the sale of illegal drugs into the United States. Fourth, if U.S. 
backed foreign anti-drug policy is not changed to combat Mexico’s monopoly of the 
methamphetamine drug trade in particular, and the Mexican government does nothing to 
seriously deter the illegal drug industry, the violence and corruption will only escalate. In 
the long term, this could be a major source of friction between the U.S. and Mexico. 
Also, if Mexican DTOs are left unchecked, their power will only further de-legitimize the 
country’s law enforcement agencies specifically and Mexico’s government more 
generally.  
C. LITERATURE REVIEW 
Most of the literature on the illicit drug trade and the U.S. mirrors U.S. 
international drug control policy. Since the early 1990s, both policy and analysis have 
focused heavily on coca cultivation and cocaine production in the source countries of 
Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia. Successful short-term coca eradication efforts in Bolivia 
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and Peru in the mid-to-late 1990s as well as the shift in coca cultivation to Colombia and 
the declining security situation there have provided plenty to both study and set and 
recalibrate policy. When drug trafficking in Mexico is included in the study and practice 
of U.S. international drug control policy, the focus has been on the impact of broader 
developments. In particular, the significance of the North American Free Trade 
Agreement (NAFTA) and the destruction of the Medellin and Cali Cartels in Colombia in 
the mid-1990s have attracted the attention of academics and policy-makers. The resulting 
literature continues, by and large to fall short, however, because it overlooks or glosses 
over contemporary trends that stem from the power struggle between Mexican and 
Colombian DTOs. It also falls short by stopping the story at the end of the 1990s by 
which time the Mexican cartels had emerged to dominate the vast majority of the 
transportation of illegal drugs either from the Andean region or from within Mexico into 
the United States. 
It is necessary, even mandatory to stress the role of NAFTA, implemented in 
1994, in the ascendancy of the Mexican cartels. Every day, more than 250,000 vehicles 
cross into the United States from Mexico.5 Most are transporting manufactured goods 
and products, but many others are transporting illegal drugs under the umbrella of free 
trade. This explains why Mexico has become the primary route for trafficking illicit drugs 
into the United States. It does not immediately explain why Mexican DTOs have shifted 
from smugglers working for the Colombian DTOs to being the major players in the 
international drug trade, dominating distribution networks within the U.S. and 
establishing direct links to coca producers in Bolivia, Peru and Colombia. 
The standard explanation for the latter shift emphasizes that the fall of the 
Medellin and Cali cartels in Colombia paved the way for the Mexican DTOs to rise to 
dominance in the illegal drug trade. As one exemplary analysis states: 
 
 
                                                 
5 Rebecca Jannol and Deborah Meyers. U.S.-Canada-Mexico Fact Sheet on Trade and Migration. 
Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., November 2003.  
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In the early and mid 1990s Colombia---with extensive logistical and 
intelligence support from the United States---effectively dismantled the 
Medellin and Cali cartels---among the most powerful criminal enterprises 
the world has ever known. The collapse of the cartel system resulted in the 
apparent fragmentation or “atomization” of the Colombian cocaine 
industry into as many as eighty to three hundred---according to widely 
varying official estimates---distinct exporting organizations.6 
The new cartels (cartelitos) that rose, Phoenix-like, from the ashes of the Medellin and 
Cali Cartels are often referred to as the “new entrepreneurs.” They view the actual 
transportation of illegal drugs as the riskiest part of the business.7 In response, to this 
situation the new smaller and independent cartels have increasingly contracted Mexican 
DTOs to handle the transportation side of the illegal drug trade, thus allowing Mexico-
based cartels to play an increasingly bigger role. 
The above explanations make clear when, why and how Mexico has become the 
primary transit point for Latin American produced cocaine destined for U.S. 
consumption. However, much less is known about how Mexican DTOs have continued to 
evolve and deepen their role in the illegal drug industry since 1995, expanding to import 
90% of the cocaine consumed in the U.S. and more recently the lion’s share of the 
methamphetamine trade as well. In part, this lack of attention can be explained by the fact 
that international drug control policy (and studies of it) have focused not only on source 
countries but also on countries which are willing to cooperate with the United States in 
the war on drugs. 
Limited cooperation between U.S. and Mexican law enforcement agencies has 
contributed to the relative lack of attention paid to the Mexican cartels over the past 15 
years. While the two countries have good relations in many ways, the lack of cooperation 
on certain issues stems from the long and fraught history between “neighbors”. This is 
not the place to go into detail, but historical events, such as the war of 1846-1848, in 
which Mexico lost half its territory to the United States, still hang over U.S.-Mexican 
                                                 
6 Menno Vellinga. The Political Economy of the Drug Industry: Latin America and the International 
System. Gainesville: University Press of Florida, 2004,188. 
7 Ibid., 15. 
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relations.8 In particular, ever since its independence from Spain, in the early decades of 
the nineteenth century Mexico has been very sensitive to sovereignty issues and any 
perceptions that the United States is meddling in its affairs provokes sharp and strident 
reactions. Mexico refused U.S. drug control assistance for several years in the 1990s, and 
continues to prohibit members of the U.S. Armed Forces from training or carrying out 
operations on Mexican territory.9 Since the Mexican government did not allow the U.S. 
military to engage in combating the flow of illegal drugs in Mexico, focus shifted to 
and/or remained on countries such as Bolivia, Peru, and Colombia that allow the U.S. 
military to operate within their borders. 
The inability of Mexico and the U.S. to work together effectively to deter cross-
border drug trafficking and the often-misguided character of U.S. international anti-drug 
policy towards Latin America have greatly benefited the Mexican cartels. Since 1995, 
Mexican cartels have not only become the primary trafficker of cocaine, headed for the 
U.S. market, it has also become the primary manufacturer and distributor of the new drug 
of choice in the U.S.: methamphetamine.10 Finally, U.S. drug control policy and the 
attention of policy analysts has tended to focus on countries where drugs pose a threat to 
the survival of the state and political stability. Where drugs fund insurgents (as has been 
the case in Peru and Colombia) or coca producers play a key role in overthrowing and 
electing presidents (as in Bolivia), both policy and analysis follows. Until recently, drug 
trafficking organizations in Mexico did not pose a threat to the state and, combined with 
the other factors discussed above this has meant that the history and importance of the 
Mexican cartels far outweighs the academic and policy analysis they have attracted. 
 
 
                                                 
8 Maureen Meyer. At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State. (Washington 
D.C. Office on Latin America, 2007). 
http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&id=594&Itmid=8 (accessed 2 March 2008). 
9 Maria C. Toro. Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: Causes and Consequences. (Boulder: Lynne Rienner 
Publishing, 1995) 32. 
10 U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center: National Drug Threat Assessment 
2007. December 2006. http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs21/21137/dtos.htm (accessed on 1 March 2007). 
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D. SOURCES AND CHAPTERS 
This thesis is based primarily on published secondary sources. U.S. Congressional 
sources include reports by the Government Accountability Office (GAO) and the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS). Other sources include the National Drug Threat 
Assessments from 1997 through 2008, Latin American Weekly journals, and books that 
discuss Mexico’s involvement in the illegal drug trade, drug related corruption in 
Mexico, Latin American gangs associated with the illegal drug trade, as well published 
literature on Mexican DTOs. What follows also draws on the web sites of the Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Department of Defense (DOD), the Washington 
Office on Latin America (WOLA), and the Department of Homeland Security (DHS). 
To tell the untold story of the Mexican DTOs’ contemporary monopolization of 
the methamphetamine industry, this thesis explores the role Mexico has played in 
providing illegal drugs to the U.S. since 1995. Chapter II explains the dynamics of the 
rise to dominance over the transportation of cocaine by the Mexican DTOs. In addition to 
the role of NAFTA and the fall of the Colombian cartels, it emphasizes the importance of 
developments both before and after these events in the rise to prominence of the Mexican 
DTOs. In particular, it shows that Mexican DTOs began their ascendance in the cocaine 
trade before the fall of the Colombian cartels and the implementation of NAFTA as a 
result of their links to corrupt networks of officials in Mexico. The ability of the former 
and the latter to drive hard bargains in negotiations with the Colombians was a key factor 
as far back as the 1980s. The chapter also shows how, later, in the 1990s and into the 21st 
century, U.S. and Colombian drug control efforts in Colombia facilitated the Mexican 
DTOs ascendance over the increasingly fragmented players in the cocaine trade in 
Colombia. The resulting Mexican dominance of the cocaine trade contributed to their 
subsequent control of the methamphetamine trade. It bears emphasizing that the cocaine 
story has continued to overshadow the fact that methamphetamine has now become at 
least as important, if not more important for the Mexican cartels. 
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Chapter III examines the history of methamphetamine use and production within 
the United States and explains how the Mexican DTOs quietly and gradually became the 
“Masters of Meth” even before they consolidated their position as the “Kings of Coke” 
during the 1990s. This chapter explains how Mexican DTOs initially supplied precursor 
chemicals for methamphetamine production within the U.S. during the 1980s, and then 
emerged as major suppliers/traffickers with the introduction of Mexican controlled 
methamphetamine Super-Labs (SLs) during the 1990s, relying on an almost never ending 
flow of ephedrine from overseas. Notably, however, the market for methamphetamine 
was limited to the western United States during this time period. In the early to mid 
1990s, Small Toxic Labs (STLs) – also known as “mom and pop” labs – literally 
exploded onto the scene in the rural mid-west, drawing the attention of both the media 
and local law enforcement to what President Clinton described in 1996 as a “meth 
epidemic”. Chapter III shows the crucial, and largely overlooked, role that Mexican 
DTOs – with an extensive network in the United States already in place as a result of 
their control of cocaine transportation -- played in spreading methamphetamine from the 
south-west of the U.S. to the rest of the country. 
Chapter IV is organized around the years 2003 through 2007, when Mexican 
DTOs consolidated their hold on the expanding methamphetamine industry. First, it 
explores the challenges associated with deterring domestic methamphetamine production 
and the way in which taking on the Small-Toxic-Labs (STLs) involved large amounts of 
U.S. law enforcement resources between the years of 1997 and 2006. The increasingly 
successful efforts by U.S. law enforcement agencies to shut down STLs actually allowed 
Mexican DTOs to completely reshape the methamphetamine production and distribution 
networks in the United States. In the process they out maneuvered the U.S. law 
enforcement agencies. While the STLs were shut down the distribution and consumption 
of methamphetamine not only continued but also increased during this period as a result 
of the new role being played by Mexican cartels. The increased operational presence of 
Mexican DTOs in the U.S. started with the cocaine trade in the mid-1990s. It allowed 
them to rapidly include methamphetamine in their distribution networks in the United 
States. Finally, this chapter explores the establishment of methamphetamine Super-Labs 
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in the central parts of the United States and in northern Mexico by 2003. It shows how 
these Super-Labs allowed for a dramatic quantitative and qualitative increase in the 
availability of methamphetamine in the U.S. between 2003 and 2007. Ultimately, when 
these factors are combined, the untold story of the rise of the Mexican cartels to their 
position as “Masters of Meth” becomes clear. 
Chapter V, the conclusion, assesses the consequences for both the United States 
and Mexico of the Mexican DTOs increasingly dominant role in the methamphetamine 
trade. According to the United Nations, Mexican DTOs now control a multi-billion dollar 
drug industry, worth upwards of USD$ 142 billion a year.11 The revenue and power 
associated with this industry poses significant problems for both countries. Within the 
U.S., Mexican DTOs have brought a degree of violence to the meth trade that did not 
previously exist. They intimidate or strong-arm meth dealers and users alike. Also, given 
the amount of revenues generated by the Mexican DTOs, they continue to acquire ever 
more significant firepower and operational sophistication (secure communications links 
and counter surveillance systems) that poses new challenges to U.S. law enforcement 
agencies. Within Mexico, Mexican DTOs continue to fight over control of smuggling 
corridors and illegal points of entry into the U.S. The violence between the narcos, their 
allies amongst the highly corrupt police forces, especially in the northern cities and states, 
is overlaid by often, violent encounters between the cartels on the one hand and Mexican 
counter-narcotics agencies and the Mexican army on the other hand. The situation at the 
time of writing had reached a level where many Mexican citizens question “if the 
government of Mexico can defeat or deter Mexican DTOs.”12 It is possible that the 
central government’s efforts, particularly via the insertion of the military into its struggle 
against the DTOs, will only help to strengthen and even unify the four major Mexican 
DTOs. Unfortunately, the most likely scenario at the present juncture is one in which the 
Mexican DTOs continue to enhance their position as “States within a State”. 
                                                 
11 “Mexico: Drug Cartels a Growing Threat.” Worldpress.org, 25 June 2007, 
http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2549.cfm (accessed 10 June 2008). 
12 “Mexico Drug Violence Intensifies,” The Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 2008, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0602/p99s01-duts.html (accessed 5 June 2008). 
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Finally, Chapter V draws lessons from the so-called “balloon effect”, or the 
“replacement effect” as it is less colloquially termed. In short this refers to fact that every 
time a drug trafficking organization, transportation network, cultivation or production site 
is brought down or eliminated, another one emerges almost immediately, having in some 
cases been sitting on the shelf in anticipation of just such a scenario. The analysis in the 
body of the thesis demonstrates that successful drug control efforts against Colombian 
cartels and U.S. “mom and pop” labs, or small toxic labs (STLs) were key factors in 
explaining the rise of Mexican DTOs. If current efforts against Mexican DTOs did lead 
to their downfall, which as suggested above is the opposite of what is actually happening 
but not necessarily impossible in the medium-term, such an outcome needs to be planned 
for. In particular, there is reason to believe that Asian DTOs are well positioned to fill 
any void in the U.S. methamphetamine trade left by successful efforts against Mexican 
DTOs. In addition, a spillover of Mexican DTOs into Guatemala and a shift in cocaine 
trafficking to the Caribbean are likely side effects of current drug control efforts in 
Mexico. The Mexican DTOs themselves emerged in part as a result of the “balloon 
effect”. If they were to be brought down over the next few years (an unlikely but not 
totally impossible scenario) the vacuum they would leave would be filled by 
organizations and networks that are already on the horizon. Like successful legal business 
operations illegal drug traffickers are constantly looking to take advantage of any misstep 
or failure on the part of their competitors. 
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II. THE RISE OF MEXICAN DRUG TRAFFICKING 
ORGANIZATIONS (DTOS) TO ASCENDANCE OVER THE 
COCAINE TRADE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
From the late 1970s through to the mid-1990s, the processing of cocaine and its 
trafficking into the United States were driven primarily by one Latin American country--
Colombia. Pablo Escobar’s Medellin Cartel pioneered the modern cocaine trade in the late 
1970s and early 1980s. Escobar and his cronies relied initially on smuggling routes through 
the Caribbean to supply Colombian trafficking organizations located along the eastern 
seaboard of the United States. By the late 1980s, the Cali Cartel had emerged as a rival and 
the two cartels increasingly relied on Mexican drug trafficking organizations to smuggle their 
product into the United States. Fifty to sixty percent of the cocaine destined for the U.S. 
market was transported through Mexico by the mid-1990s. This share steadily increased so 
that by 2000, an estimated 66% of the cocaine heading for the U.S. passed through Mexico. 
This percentage increased to 77% in 2003 and 90% by 2006.13 Over the same period, not 
surprisingly, Mexican cartels dramatically expanded their role in the cocaine trade. They 
went from middlemen who smuggled cocaine across the border for the Colombians, to 
powerful traffickers who challenged Colombian control of the wholesale market within the 
United States. They also began to bypass the southern transportation routes controlled by the 
Colombians by establishing ties directly with the producers in South America. This chapter 
explains the increased reliance on Mexico as a route for cocaine shipments into the United 
States and, even more importantly, the increasingly dominant role the Mexican DTOs have 
come to play in the cocaine trade. The growing profits going to Mexican DTOs, and the 
regular if not incessant struggles over the increasingly profitable trade, is reflected in the 
high-levels of corruption and violence in Mexico in recent years. 
                                                 
13 United States Government Accountability Office. Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has Helped 
Mexican Counter-narcotics Efforts, but the Flow of Illegal Drugs into the Unites States Remains High. 
Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director of International Affairs and Trade, Before the Subcommittee on the 
Western Hemisphere, Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives on 25 October 2007. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08215t.pdf (accessed on 28 April 2008). 
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In order to explain the ascendance over the cocaine trade by Mexican drug 
trafficking organizations, this chapter begins by exploring the role of U.S. drug 
interdiction efforts in shutting down the Caribbean drug routes in the mid 1980s, and 
forcing Colombian traffickers to increasingly turn to Mexican DTOs as middlemen. 
Second, it shows how the Mexican DTOs were able to pressure the Colombians into 
paying them in cocaine instead of cash, a move that allowed the Mexican organizations to 
expand into the wholesale market in the United States. Third, it examines the fall of the 
Medellin and Cali Cartels by the mid-1990s. Under siege by the government, in large part 
because of the Medellin Cartel’s virtual declaration of war on the state itself, the 
Colombian cartels were unable to effectively counter the Mexican cartels increased role 
in cocaine trafficking. Furthermore, by the time the Colombian government had 
eliminated the Medellin Cartel and then the Cali Cartel, the array of small Colombian 
cartels (cartelitos) were both unable and unwilling to control the transportation of 
cocaine, which quickly fell almost completely into the hands of the increasingly powerful 
Mexican organizations. Fourth, it discusses the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA) which came into effect in 1994 and the way in which it facilitated the dramatic 
expansion of illegal drug shipments from Mexico into the United States. Finally, this 
chapter shows how Plan Colombia, with Washington’s support, continued to pressure the 
cartelitos in Colombia, driving them (whether they wanted to or not) to concentrate on 
managing the growth of coca and the production of cocaine, ceding responsibility for 
transportation and distribution the Mexican cartels. 
B. “THE VORTEX OF THE AMERICAS”: THE RISE AND FALL OF THE 
CARIBBEAN COCAINE ROUTES 
The famous Cuban intellectual and nationalist, Jose Martí once described the 
Caribbean as “the vortex of the Americas.”14 The Caribbean offers over 1 million square 
miles of navigational water for maritime traffic, and numerous islands with functional 
airports and landing strips.15 Over the centuries, the Caribbean has been a key zone of 
                                                 
14 Cited in Ivelaw L. Griffith. Drugs and Security in the Caribbean. (University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997) 53.  
15 Ibid., 54. 
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illegal activity. For many people “Pirates of the Caribbean”, the now famous Hollywood 
Trilogy starring Johnny Depp as Captain Jack Sparrow, may be about all they know 
about piracy in the region. While, Captain Jack Sparrow may not be a historical figure, he 
does at least convey the fact that piracy was part and parcel of every-day life from the 
sixteenth century down to the nineteenth century and a central theme in the history of the 
Caribbean. Subsequently it was a major conduit for rum running during the 1920s, at the 
time of prohibition in the United States, and a site of innumerable transit and drop-off 
zones for the marijuana trade by the 1960s. During the late 1970s through the 1980s, the 
Caribbean was the main route between North America and South America for cocaine 
destined for the insatiable U.S. market. 
To understand how the Caribbean cocaine route was born, we need to look at the 
rise of the Medellin Cartel and particularly one of its founding members, Carlos Lehder 
Rivas. Lehder Rivas revolutionized cocaine trafficking by shifting from individual 
couriers to bulk delivery, thus reducing the price and increasing the quantity of cocaine 
entering the U.S. market by the late 1980s. There is a certain irony here, as Merril Collett 
explains in. The Cocaine Connection, insofar as Lehder Rivas “dreamed up the scheme” 
while he was “serving a marijuana smuggling sentence in a U.S. prison”. His plan was to 
transport “cocaine in small private planes and boats through the Caribbean”. The 
Medellin Cartel subsequently “moved cocaine by the ton in cargo containers carried on 
freighters”. These dramatic changes to both the quantity and quality of cocaine entering 
the United States brought the price on the street price down to USD$ 70-170 per gram by 
1988, a new record as it were up to that point.16 
In response to the increase cocaine flow through the Caribbean, President Reagan 
established the South Florida Task Force in January 1982 and appointed Vice President 
George Bush to head it. The interagency task force backed by the most up-to-date 
equipment for detection and monitoring of illegal drug trafficking, coupled with the use 
of civilian law enforcement personnel and equipment started patrols and interdiction 
operations later that year. By the late 1980s, the Colombian cartels had begun to feel the 
                                                 
16 Merril Collett. The Cocaine Connection: Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations, (New 
York: Foreign Policy Association Press Inc, 1989) 15.  
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heat. With the assistance of the U.S. Airforce and the U.S. Navy, the U.S. Drug 
Enforcement Administration (DEA) had reduced smuggling profits for Colombian cartels 
by 50 percent or more.17 
As the 1980s came to an end, the Caribbean drug routes were quickly losing or 
had already lost their cost effectiveness, this led to the establishment and strengthening of 
linkages between the Colombian cartels and Mexican DTOs. Shipments of cocaine were 
increasingly airlifted straight from Colombia to northern Mexico in the late 1980s. By 
some estimates, up to two-thirds of the cocaine destined for the United States was coming 
in via Mexico by 1990.18 At this point, as already mentioned, Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations acted primarily as middlemen in the cocaine trade. The Gulf Cartel or one 
of the other four main Mexican Cartels would smuggle the drugs across the border and 
turn the shipments over to Colombian distribution cells in the United States.19 Within 
five years, this situation had changed dramatically as Mexican drug trafficking 
organizations increasingly demanded to be paid in cocaine instead of cash; this move 
allowed them to increase their presence in the wholesale cocaine market in the U.S. and 
dramatically increase their profits. 
C. FROM MIDDLEMEN TO THE COSTCO OF COCAINE 
The modus operandi of the Colombian cartels was to cede as little control as 
possible over the cocaine trade from growth and production to transportation, 
distribution, wholesale and even retail. In Peru and Bolivia, for example, they interacted 
directly with coca-growing peasants and resisted, to whatever extent possible, the 
emergence of Peruvian and Bolivian middlemen. In Mexico, however, Colombian 
traffickers had no choice but to rely on Mexican drug trafficking organizations. The 
Mexican cartels had a long history of drug smuggling and were extremely knowledgeable 
                                                 
17 Patrick L. Clawson and Rensselaer W. Lee. The Andean Cocaine Industry, (New York: St. Martin’s 
Press, 1996) 41. 
18 United States Government Accountability Office. Drug Control: Revised Drug Interdiction 
Approach Is Needed in Mexico. Report to the Chairman and Ranking Minority Member, Committee on 
Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives on 8 May 1993. http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149222.pdf 
(accessed on 28 April 2008). 
19 Clawson and Lee. The Andean Cocaine Industry, 42. 
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about transit routes. Furthermore, the Mexican drug trafficking organizations were linked 
to corrupt Mexican law enforcement personnel and most importantly, prior to the end of 
one-party dominance under the Partido Revolucionario Institucional (PRI) at the end of 
the 1990s, still operated under the protection of a corrupt and entrenched political 
hierarchy. The Mexican cartels, alliance with, if not subordination to, the elaborate and 
highly corrupt patron-client networks that ran all the way to the top in Mexico City were 
necessary for large-scale smuggling in the 1980s and early 1990s.  
These factors allowed Mexican drug trafficking organizations to bargain with 
Colombians from a position of relative strength. But, the real change in the Mexican-
Colombian relationship occurred when the operational and financial risks of continuing 
to try and control the Mexican end of the operation became apparent to the Colombians at 
the start of the 1990s. As an official DEA history recounts: 
On September 29, 1989, the American public was presented with 
irrefutable evidence of the enormous volume of cocaine coming into the 
country when the DEA raided a warehouse in Sylmar, California, and 
seized 21.5 tons of cocaine. Such a huge amount of cocaine was amassed 
at the Sylmar warehouse because of a conflict between Colombia-based 
distributors and the Mexico-based group they had hired to transport the 
drug. The group from Mexico had continued to transport cocaine to the 
warehouse but refused to release it to the Colombian distributors until they 
were paid for their transportation services. This was the largest cocaine 
seizure in U.S. history. Colombian drug traffickers responded to the 
staggering Sylmar seizure by changing the way they compensated 
transportation groups from Mexico; they began to pay Mexico-based 
smuggling organizations up to 50 percent of each cocaine shipment in 
product rather than in cash. This shift to using cocaine as compensation 
for transportation services radically changed the role and sphere of 
influence of Mexico-based trafficking organizations in the U.S. cocaine 
trade. Criminal groups from Mexico became not only transporters, but also 
distributors of cocaine.20 
The above quote makes abundantly clear the power that Mexican-based DTOs had 
achieved over the transportation and distribution of cocaine by the late 1980s. They not 
only changed the way cocaine was delivered to the U.S., but they also changed the way 
                                                 
20 DEA History, 1985-1990, http://www.deamuseum.org/dea_history_book/1985_1990.htm (accessed 
on 25 May 2008). 
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Colombian cartels compensated smugglers for their services. The power of the Mexican 
DTOs was further consolidated in the early to mid 1990s as the Colombian cartels found 
themselves fighting for their very survival (a fight that they lost) against the full force of 
the Colombian state backed up by U.S. assistance. At this point they had no choice but to 
delegate more and more of the transportation and distribution of the cocaine to the 
Mexican DTOs. The Mexican cartels were already well on their way to becoming the 
COSTCO of Cocaine once the Colombian cartels were brought down in relatively quick 
succession between 1993 and 1995. 
D. DRUG LORDS COME AND DRUG LORDS GO: BRINGING DOWN THE 
MEDELLIN AND CALI CARTELS 
Between 1993 and 1995, two major events took place in Colombia that 
dramatically changed the cocaine trade. First, the killing of Pablo Escobar in December 
1993 and the fall of the Medellin Cartel shortly thereafter, allowed the Cali Cartel to 
briefly monopolize the flow of cocaine from Colombia. Second, within less than two 
years all the leaders of the Cali Cartel had been captured and their organization had been 
eliminated. The demise of the Colombian cartels and their replacement by a large number 
of smaller cartels (cartelitos) in the mid-1990s, which focused their operations entirely on 
growth and production inside Colombia, is crucial to the Mexican DTOs ascendance to 
dominance over the cocaine trade. 
1. The Rise and Fall of the Medellin Cartel 
In 1989, Pablo Escobar, the head of the Medellin Cartel was, according to Forbes 
Magazine, “the seventh-richest man in the world.”21 The wealth that Escobar 
accumulated during his tenure as one of the first major drug lords of the modern era 
allowed him to revolutionize the cocaine industry. He and his organization facilitated the 
mass production of cocaine, while establishing the complex smuggling networks that 
flooded the U.S. illegal drug market. He operated a small squadron of aircraft devoted to 
carrying refined cocaine directly into the United States. Complementing his airborne 
                                                 
21 Mark Bowden. Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw (New York, NY: Atlantic 
Monthly Press, 2001) 59. 
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delivery system was a small surface fleet of “go-fast” boats that delivered cocaine to 
Florida and the U.S. Virgin Islands.22 His dominance of the cocaine trade was 
increasingly grounded in acts of brutal murder and harsh violence directed against any 
and all challengers to the Medellin Cartel, especially the Colombian National Police 
(CNP).23 Escobar was more interested in fighting the CNP than corrupting them. More 
generally he waged a reign of terror that included the murder of four presidential 
candidates, the assassination of hundreds, if not thousands, of police officers, as well as 
the bombing of shopping centers, airplanes and law enforcement offices. In response, the 
Colombian government, spearheaded by the CNP, ratcheted up their attempt to bring 
down the Medellin Cartel. In 1989 the authorities arrested José Gonzalo Rodríguez 
Gacha, the organization’s second in command. The demise of the cartel was completed 
with the killing of Pablo Escobar by the CNP in December 1993. 
2. The Brief Dominance and Rapid Demise of the Cali Cartel 
With the dismantling of the Medellin Cartel, a project in which it is now clear that 
the Cali Cartel provided assistance, the latter moved to a position of brief dominance of 
the flow of cocaine out of Colombia. However, like its defunct competitor, it had to deal 
with the increasingly powerful Mexican drug trafficking organizations that sought to 
control transportation and distribution themselves rather than as “employees” of the 
Colombians. The following quote from the Congressional Testimony of a DEA agent in 
1996 demonstrates how the Mexican DTOs had been able to enhance their position in the 
international drug trade even before the demise of the Cali Cartel: 
Today, there is no question that drug traffickers operating in Mexico have 
become major players in the international drug trade. Receiving payment 
in both cash and cocaine [from the Cali cartel], they have begun to 
establish their own cocaine distribution networks and territories, stretching 
from the Southwest border areas as far as New York.24  
                                                 
22 Clawson and Lee. The Andean Cocaine Industry, 47. 
23 Ibid., 50. 
24 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Statement of Thomas A. Constantine, Administrator, Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee on 8 August 1995. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct950808.htm (accessed 20 April 2008). 
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At the same time, the Cali Cartel’s mode of operation differed from the Medellin 
Cartel in a number of important ways. The crucial difference for our purposes is the fact 
that, it tried to avoid the use of murder, violence, and intimidation against the CNP and 
public officials and politicians generally. It relied on corruption rather than violence to 
advance its goals in Colombia. With the Medellin Cartel out of the way the Cali Cartel 
launched a campaign to gain ground vis-à-vis the Mexican Cartels. The Cali Cartel was a 
major contributor to the campaign of PRI presidential candidate Ernesto Zedillo in 1994: 
Peter Lupsha noted that: 
Usually reliable sources say that one of the major contributors from the 
foreign private sector to this campaign was the Cali drug trafficking cartel. 
During the late spring and summer of 1994, they report, Miguel 
Rodriguez-Orejuela of the Cali group sent $40 million (U.S.) dollars, in 
two shipments, to Mexico. While this could have been for economic 
investment, they hypothesize it was for political corruption, to guarantee 
Cali a superior, favored, and protected position in the new administration. 
With demand decline and cocaine market saturation in the U.S., Cali has 
had to find new production efficiencies, as well as product diversification 
(heroin and marijuana oil) to maintain profits. With high level internal 
Mexican government support, however, Cali would be in a position to lean 
on certain Mexican trafficking groups to lower their per kilo share to a 
more reasonable level.25 
This effort was cut short by the demise of the Cali cartel shortly after the start of the 
Zedillo presidency. During the summer of 1995, six top leaders of the Cali Cartel 
surrendered or were arrested by Colombian authorities. In short order the Cali Cartel had 
effectively disappeared.26 
The demise of the Cali Cartel, like the demise of the Medellin Cartel before it, 
sent shock waves through the cocaine industry in Colombia. After the fall of the Cali 
Cartel, Mexican DTOs found themselves interacting with a number of new smaller 
Colombian cartels that were far more specialized and adopted a much low-profile in their 
operations than had hitherto been the situation in Colombia. These new cartels, or 
                                                 
25 Peter Lupsha. Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco-Investment: A Focus on Mexico. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/readings/lupsha.html (accessed 30 May 2008). 
26 DEA History Book 1994-1998. http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/1994-1998.html (accessed 4 
April 2008). 
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cartelitos, viewed the smuggling aspect of the cocaine trade as the riskiest part of the 
cocaine industry. They had no choice but to engage Mexican DTOs on their own terms. 
They focused on the growing of coca and the production of cocaine in Colombia and 
willing or unwillingly turned the transportation and distribution of cocaine over to the 
Mexican cartels.27 
The fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels during the first half of the 1990s, 
combined with the effective closure of the Caribbean drug routes, propelled the Mexican 
DTOs to a position of almost complete dominance over the movement of cocaine into the 
U.S. by the late 1990s. As already noted, a third change in the early 1990s facilitated the 
rise to dominance of the cocaine trade by the Mexican DTOs. The implementation of the 
North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) in early 1994 gave Mexican DTOs an 
advantage that no other Latin American DTO could even begin to contemplate. NAFTA 
revolutionized the Mexican cartels use of the already porous 2000-mile long border with 
the United States. 
E THE IMPLEMENTATION OF NAFTA 
The North American Free Trade Agreement involved Canada, Mexico and the 
United States. It was conceived as a means to increase trade and investment between the 
three already closely connected national economies of North America.28 While 
dramatically increasingly the flow of legal trade and investment, NAFTA also gave 
Mexican drug traffickers new means by which they could move their product into the 
United States. 
A prime example is the border crossing station in Laredo, Texas. Under the 
umbrella of free trade, border crossings at Laredo into the U.S. increased by 300 percent 
within five years after the implementation of NAFTA. Along the border as a whole, 
nearly 4 million vehicles crossed into the U.S. from Mexico in 1999. With the U.S. 
                                                 
27 DEA History Book 1994-1998. http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/1994-1998.html (accessed 4 
April 2008). 
28 United States Department of Agriculture. North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) 
http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/Policy/NAFTA/nafta.asp (accessed 20 January 2008). 
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Department of Transportation and the Border Patrol Agency already stretched to the limit, 
they can only check 4 percent of this traffic.29 This ensures that literally millions of 
containers, trailer trucks as well as more modest modes of transportation are used with 
increasing ease to transport illegal drugs into the United States from Mexico. During a 
Congressional Testimony in 2003 a DEA agent described how NAFTA had facilitated and 
deepened the penetration of illegal drug markets in the Mid-West as well as the Northeastern 
and southeastern regions of the U.S by the Mexican cartels. 
A large volume of traffic crosses our border every day, and major 
transportation projects are underway. Since the formation of NAFTA, 
commercial truck crossings from Mexico into West Texas and New Mexico 
have risen 11.7%, from 666,225 trucks in 1999 to 744,407 in 2002. Pedestrian 
traffic has risen 55%, from 6.2 million in 1999 to 9.6 million in 2002. A 
reduction in the amount of private vehicle traffic was seen in 2002, due to 
heightened security after September 11, 2001. However, 15.3 million vehicles 
still crossed our borders in 2002. DEA investigations in this area indicate that 
illegal drugs being transshipped from Mexico through the West Texas/New 
Mexico area usually are destined for Kansas City, Chicago, Atlanta and/or 
New York.30  
Despite the dramatic increase in the flow of illegal drugs across the border by the end 
of the 1990s, U.S. anti-drug policy makers appeared to be relatively unconcerned with the 
Mexican DTOs new position as the COSTCO of cocaine. Washington and the DEA 
continued to be preoccupied with trying to curb or eliminate the growth of coca and the 
production of cocaine at its source further to the south. To this end Plan Colombia was 
implemented starting in 1999. While regarded by many as a success in relation to Colombia 
itself, its negative consequences are apparent the way in which the Mexican DTOs became 
the single greatest providers of illegal drugs (including cocaine) to the United States at the 
very time that Plan Colombia was in full-swing. At the start of Plan  
 
 
                                                 
29 Report to Congressional Requesters. U.S.-Mexico Border: Issues and Challenges Confronting the 
United States and Mexico. 12 July 1999. 
30 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Statement of Sandalio Gonzalez, Special Agent in Charge 
El Paso Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the House Committee on Government Reform 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources on 15 April 2003. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct041503.html (accessed 20 April 2008). 
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Colombia, less than two-thirds of the cocaine destined for the United States entered the 
country via Mexico; by 2006, this had increased to almost ninety percent (as the 
following map illustrates). 
 
Figure 1.   Cocaine Movement Corridors for 2006 [Source: NDIC 2006]. 
 
F. PLAN COLOMBIA 
When Andres Pastrana won the Colombian presidential election in June 1998, 
Colombia was, from the point of view of many observers, a “weak state” on the edge of 
becoming a “failed state”. The Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias Colombianas 
(FARC—the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia) had begun to operate in 
battalion-sized units. In 1996 they dealt a major blow to the Colombian military, 
defeating them in series of battles that raised serious questions about the Army’s capacity 
to deal with the FARC. In response to the regular military’s failures on the battlefield, 
Colombian right-wing paramilitaries were galvanized into action, forming a national-
level coordinating body in 1997. The Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC—United 
Self-defense Organizations of Colombia) launched a dramatic and indiscriminate 
offensive against the guerrillas, committing massive human rights violations in the 
process. The intensification of the struggle between the AUC and the FARC was financed 
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in significant measure by the drug trade. In this period there was a significant increase in 
coca cultivation in the south in which both groups were involved either directly, or most 
commonly in the case of the FARC, via the protection of coca growers and the “taxation” 
of the transportation of cocaine. The AUC, which was even more directly involved in 
coca growing and cocaine production, along with the FARC, were linked in various ways 
to the cartelitos. They were all part of, and carried along by, the new approach to the 
cocaine trade in Colombia in the wake of the demise of the Medellin and Cali Cartels in 
1993 and 1995 respectively. 
Following Pastrana’s election as President of Colombia (1998-2002), against the 
backdrop of the rising power of the FARC and the AUC, and the weakness of the 
Colombian military he quickly moved, with U.S. support, to introduce Plan Colombia. In 
the words of the planners: 
The government of Colombia has developed a multi-year, comprehensive 
strategy designed to bring about lasting peace by reducing the production 
of illegal drugs, revitalizing the economy and strengthening government 
institutions. This is known as Plan Colombia.31 
What President Pastrana thought he was introducing was a carefully thought out set of 
mutually reinforcing initiatives that “shared responsibility” between illegal drug 
producing and illegal drug consuming countries. Plan Colombia placed emphasis upon 
strengthening the Colombian state and re-energizing an economy with at least 20 percent  
unemployment. Its goals included generating the conditions necessary for the pursuit of 
peace and the control of the expansion of illegal crops and drug trafficking. In Pastrana’s 
eyes, Plan Colombia was nothing less than a grand strategy for remaking Colombia into a 
safe, secure and democratic polity.32 Of the USD$ 7.5 billion originally slated for Plan 
Colombia, USD$ 4.5 billion was to be supplied by the Colombian government, while the 
USD$ 3 billion would come from the international community led by the United States. 
Washington was expected to provide resources for the military and police, while various 
                                                 
31 Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia: The Roadmap for Peace. 
http://www.colombiacmb.org/opencm/opencms/plancolombia.html (accessed 16 December 2007). 
32 Gabriel Marcella. Implementing Plan Colombia: Some Differing Perspectives. (Washington, D.C. 
The Strategic Studies Institute, 2001) 3, 5. 
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European governments were committed to contribute to the social and economic 
programs that were supposed to be at the heart of Plan Colombia. Given the 
overwhelmingly military focus of the U.S. aid package, Plan Colombia has often been 
portrayed by the media as primarily, if not exclusively, as a military operation.33 This 
was certainly the case, but both in theory and practice it also had an important social and 
developmental dimension, and President Pastrana in particular was committed to both 
bringing about peace and enhancing economic development and social progress. 
That said the Colombian Army was an important focus of Plan Colombia, which 
involved training by U.S. forces, backed up with the latest U.S. military hardware. In 
2001, the total U.S. interagency assistance package included: 
$390.5 million to support the Government of Colombia's objective to gain 
control of the drug producing regions of Southern Colombia. These funds 
will support certain aspects of training and equipping the second and third 
counter-narcotics battalions in the Colombian army. It will fund 
procurement and support of 14 UH-60 Blackhawk helicopters ($208 
million); procurement, refurbishment, and support of 30 UH-1H Huey II 
helicopters ($60 million); and support for 15 UH-1N helicopters ($60 
million) for use by the Colombian army.34 
While U.S. helicopters were initially important for the “push into Southern Colombia” 
and the targeting of areas of coca cultivation, over time increasing resources have been 
devoted to interdiction efforts within Colombia and along its borders. The 2002 
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) explained how, in less than four 
years Plan Colombia produced record results as far as the cocaine trade was concerned. 
For 2002, the Colombian Drug Information System (SIDCO), reported the 
seizure of 124 metric tons (MT) of cocaine HCl/cocaine base; 67,637 
gallons of cocaine in production; 362 MT of coca leaves; 27 MT of coca 
seeds; 680 kilograms of heroin; and 73 MT of cannabis. SIDCO also 
reported the destruction of 1,247 cocaine base labs; 129 cocaine HCl labs 
and 3 heroin labs; the capture of 2,430 MT of solid precursor chemicals 
and 1,990,314 gallons of liquid precursors; the seizure of 731 vehicles, 91 
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boats, 3 aircraft and 35,907 weapons; the destruction of 3 clandestine 
airstrips; and the arrest 15,199 people for narcotics trafficking offenses. 
The U.S. supported aerial eradication program, bolstered by three new 
AT-802 spray aircraft, had a record year. The DIRAN sprayed a total of 
approximately 122,695 hectares of coca and 3,043 hectares of opium 
poppy. The total for coca is a record high and 45 percent more than 
sprayed in 2001. The poppy total is 67 percent higher than sprayed in 
2001.35 
As a result of increased interdiction, the Colombian cartelitos have had to devote 
their time to adapting to government pressure on their operations. They have had little 
time, even if they wanted to, to change the terms of their partnership with the Mexican 
DTOs. In short, since the end of the 1980s pressure on the Colombian drug traffickers, 
first in the form of the targeting of the Medellin and Cali Cartels and then the cartelitos 
has led to major changes in the international drug trade and the ascendance of Mexican 
DTOs. The FARC, the paramilitaries and the cartelitos have had to work out new 
arrangements for the growing, processing and movement of cocaine within Colombian 
borders. Meanwhile, they have taken little interest and had even less time to challenge the 
Mexican DTO’s dominance of the transportation of cocaine northwards and its 
distribution in the United States.36  
In addition, Mexican DTOs have sought to take advantage of the reordering of the 
Andean drug trade occasioned by Plan Colombia (and previous drug control efforts in 
Bolivia and Peru). They have sought out direct relationships with coca producers in all 
three Andean countries. For example, they have established contacts with the FARC as 
well as with growers in Bolivia and Peru. For example, according to one source 
“Mexican dealers were spotted in southern Colombia, allegedly seeking to buy cocaine 
directly from the FARC.”37 In the end, Plan Colombia, coming on the heels of the major 
changes of the first half of the 1990s, forced the Colombian cocaine industry to turn with 
                                                 
35 U.S. Department of State. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) for 2002. 
http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17944.htm (accessed on 30 May 2008). 
36 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia” Latin American Report Number 11 
(January 27 2005) 16. 
37 International Crisis Group, “War and Drugs in Colombia” 10. 
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even greater intensity to the Mexican DTOs as the primary distributors of cocaine to the 
U.S. market. As the International Crisis Group observed in 2007: 
The demise of the big cartels and the birth of a fourth generation, the baby 
cartels, brought with it substantial changes in how the drug business is 
conducted in Colombia. Most importantly, these small, discrete, 
commercially sophisticated organizations (there may be up to 400) have a 
strictly businesslike approach. They act as suppliers of a commodity; they 
are not interested in controlling the whole chain. They are illegal service 
providers, who seek to subcontract whole portions of the chain to 
specialized entities.38 
G. CONCLUSION 
The 1990s proved to be a decade of turbulence, transformation, and re-invention 
for the Colombian cocaine industry. Both U.S. anti-drug policy makers and the 
Colombian National Police (CNP), in the context of the wider “War on Drugs” generally, 
and Plan Colombia, more specifically, thought they were making headway in limiting the 
flow of cocaine into the U.S. In reality, all they were doing was facilitating the 
reorganization of the delivery process. By 2006, 88 percent of Colombian cocaine was 
shipped to Mexico and from there was smuggled into the U.S. by Mexican DTOs. It is 
clear that by the first decade of the 21st century Mexican drug trade organizations had a 
virtual monopoly of the cocaine trade into the United States. The four main contemporary 
Mexican cartels are, without a doubt, deserving of the sobriquet, the COSTCO of 
Cocaine. 
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III. THE UNTOLD STORY: THE RISE OF MEXICAN DTOS TO 
DOMINANCE OVER THE METHAMPHETAMINE TRADE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the history of methamphetamine use and production within 
the United States and explains how overtime Mexican DTOs became the “Masters of 
Meth” at the same time they were monopolizing cocaine smuggling duties for the 
Colombian DTOs during the first part of the 1990s. The methamphetamine trade greatly 
differs from the cocaine trade in one particularly important way as far as the Mexican 
cartels are concerned. Mexican DTOs depend on other Latin American drug 
organizations to grow, cultivate, and then produce refined cocaine within their countries 
and then supply the Mexican DTOs with the finished product to smuggle into the U.S. In 
the case of methamphetamine, however, the situation is completely different because 
methamphetamine requires only manmade chemicals, such as ephedrine for its 
production. This chapter explains how Mexican DTOs initially supplied these precursor 
chemicals for methamphetamine production to U.S. producers during the 1980s, and then 
emerged as major suppliers and traffickers with the introduction of Mexican controlled 
methamphetamine Super-Labs (SLs) during the late 1980s and 1990s, first in the U.S. 
and then Mexico. This chapter challenges the conventional wisdom that U.S. Small-
Toxic-Labs (STLs) were the primary reason methamphetamine use spread from the 
western regions to the rest of the country. It argues that it was Mexican DTO-controlled 
Super-Labs (SLs) that were the primary driver behind the spread of methamphetamine 
use across the United States from 1993 to 2003. In particular, the Mexican DTOs made 
the drug cheaper and more readily available than ever before. 
B. THE ORIGINS OF METHAMPHETAMINE USE IN THE U.S. 
To understand how methamphetamine use began in the U.S., two factors must be 
addressed. First, we must understand what methamphetamine is and how it relates to  
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amphetamines more generally. Second, we must understand how it was introduced to the 
U.S. population. The following quote nicely captures the relationship between 
amphetamines and methamphetamine: 
Amphetamines are a category of drugs that include dextroamphetamine 
(Dexadrine), methamphetamine drugs include (Methedrine and (Desoxyn) 
and amphetamine itself (Benzadrine). All are central nervous system 
stimulants. Many data sources do not distinguish between the general 
category of amphetamines and methamphetamines, and simply combine 
them into a general category of amphetamine-like substances.39 
The introduction of methamphetamine into the U.S. and its growing use and abuse can 
not be so neatly defined. Methamphetamine use within the U.S. can be traced back to the 
1940s and 1950s as a result of the fact that it was increasingly prescribed by doctors as a 
bronchial dilator. It was also soon found to be useful against narcolepsy, attention deficit 
disorder, obesity, and chronic fatigue.40  
Between 1950 and 1970, a new sub-culture of “speed freaks” emerged in the U.S., 
including women who abused methamphetamine to lose weight, truck drivers and college 
students trying to stay awake, and drug users mixing methamphetamine with other drugs 
like barbiturates and heroin. Its availability as a legal drug enhanced its availability and in 
response the drug was made a Schedule II substance in 1970.41 Once the drug became 
illegal, outlaw motorcycle gangs assumed a dominant role in supplying the drug to users.  
C. METHAMPHETAMINE PRODUCTION AND DISTRIBUTION BY 
OUTLAW MOTORCYCLE GANGS (OMGS) 
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs) in the southwestern regions of the U.S. were 
the leading suppliers and distributors of methamphetamine. This was due in large part to 
their nomadic life-style that allowed them to produce methamphetamine in the remote 
areas of the Southwest, and then distribute their product to the larger urban areas that 
were positioned around major interstates and roadways. Whenever the OMGs travelled 
                                                 
39 Dana Hunt, Sarah Kuck, and Linda Truitt. Methamphetamine Use: Lessons Learned. (U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006). www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209730.pdf (accessed 20 April 2008) 1. 
40 Ibid., 4. 
41 Ibid. 
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throughout the Southwest regions of the U.S, they were able to sell methamphetamine to 
the local population. This is the principle reason behind the fact that methamphetamine 
use and production was concentrated in states such as California, Nevada, and Arizona, 
the epicenters of OMG activity. 
In 1980, the U.S. government imposed strict controls on the chemicals and 
equipment that OMGs used to make methamphetamine, thus putting a temporary end to 
production. Within a few years, however, methamphetamine “cooks” making the drug for 
West Coast OMGs discovered that ephedrine---an ingredient found in over-the-counter 
cold remedies could produce a new form of methamphetamine---“crystal meth.”42 
Crystal-meth was twice as potent and highly addictive, and it changed the 
methamphetamine industry the same way “crack cocaine” later transformed the illegal 
cocaine industry. With this discovery, two events took place that drastically changed the 
methamphetamine drug industry. First, Mexican DTOs started supplying ephedrine to the 
OMGs and other methamphetamine manufacturers in the United States. Second, Mexican 
DTOs soon took over production, establishing “Super-Labs” in California where meth 
could be mass-produced. The following pages explain how these two events fueled 
methamphetamine production and use through the early 1990s. 
D. MEXICAN DTOS MAKE THEIR MOVE INTO THE U.S. 
METHAMPHETAMINE INDUSTRY 
During the mid 1980s, one Mexican based DTO in particular broke away from 
their traditional cocaine, heroin, and marijuana smuggling duties and branched out into 
providing ephedrine, the key precursor chemical for methamphetamine production to 
U.S. OMGs. Jesus and Luis Amezcua, the founding members of the Amezcua Mexican 
Cartel operating out of Guadalajara, in the Mexican state of Jalisco, began supplying 
ephedrine in large amounts to the OMGs.43 However, the Amezcua Cartel did not limit 
its supply of ephedrine to the OMGs. They had customers throughout California, 
particularly in the Central Valley region. From these early beginnings all of the Mexican 
                                                 
42 Frontline, “The Meth Epidemic” Public Broadcasting Service (PBS), 2 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meth/etc/cron.html (accessed 6 March 2008). 
43 Frontline, “The Meth Epidemic” 2. 
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DTOs were working with contacts in Germany to import thousands of metric tons of 
ephedrine into Mexico by the end of the 1980s.44 Mexican DTOs would then 
subsequently smuggle the ephedrine into the U.S. to Super-Labs under their control. At 
this time, methamphetamine production, distribution and use were still concentrated in 
the west and southwest. This was made clear by the pattern of meth seizures in 1992: It 
was those “DEA field divisions posted in Dallas, Texas, Denver, Colorado, Los Angeles, 
San Diego, San Francisco, California, Phoenix, Arizona, and Seattle, Washington” that 
shut down about “83 percent of all methamphetamine laboratories during 1992.45 
DEA and local, state, and federal law enforcement agencies soon realized that the 
Mexican DTOs had come to dominate methamphetamine production and distribution in 
Riverside, San Bernadino, San Diego and Fresno, California.46 By 1993, four out of 
every five hits of meth consumed in the United States came from the Mexican controlled 
labs in California’s Central Valley. This was made possible by the Amezcua Cartel’s 
ability in particular to develop sources for bulk ephedrine powder overseas (from the 
Czech Republic, China, and India). The DEA learned that “during one 18-month period, 
the Amezcua cartel smuggled 170 tons of ephedrine to the United States”. This 
represented “enough ephedrine to produce 2 billion hits of meth”.47 
As a result, by 1993 groups that had come to prominence in some cases via the 
manufacture of methamphetamine in the U.S. increasingly found it was “more cost 
effective to purchase it from Mexican sources.”48 Steve Suo, an investigative reporter for 
The Oregonian, noted at the time that”: 
The Amezcua brothers revolutionized the meth trade. They turned it from 
a small mom-and-pop backyard operation to an industrial-scale production 
                                                 
44 1993 U.S. Drug Threat Assessment 85, www.druglibrary.org/schaffer/govpubs/usdta.htm. (accessed 
25 May 2007).  
45 Ibid., 79. 
46 Ibid., 85.  
47 Frontline, “The Meth Epidemic”. 4. 
48 1993 U.S. Drug Threat Assessment, 85. 
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line. They made possible the super lab, which is capable of producing 
1,500 times what an ordinary user can make for himself.49 
This revolution would have a dramatic impact on methamphetamine use within 
the U.S. As methamphetamine purity doubled, the number of people entering rehab for 
methamphetamine abuse skyrocketed.50 At the same time, the street price of 
methamphetamine decreased sharply starting in 1992. (See Figure 2 below.). 
 
Average Price for Methamphetamine,1989 to 1998. 
 
 
Figure 2.   Average Price for Methamphetamine 1989-1998 [Source: 2000 
ONDCP51] 
 
Although the Mexican DTOs had revolutionized the methamphetamine trade 
within the U.S. by the early 1990s, their actions were largely ignored because domestic 
methamphetamine production was growing at the same time, in the form of Small-Toxic-
                                                 
49 Frontline, “The Meth Epidemic” 4. 
50 Frontline, “The Meth Epidemic,” 4. 
51 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). National Drug Control Strategy 2000 Annual 
Report. http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/ndcs00/chap2_5.html (accessed 6 March 
2008). 
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Labs (STLs), also known as “mom and pop” labs. These labs captured the attention of 
both rural law enforcement agencies and the mass media. While these labs played a key 
role in introducing methamphetamine to rural areas of the Midwest, thus extending the 
methamphetamine market eastward, it was the Mexican DTO-controlled Super labs that 
quietly converted this niche market into a larger-scale consumer base. 
E. THE METH EPIDEMIC OF THE 1990S: THE ROLE OF STLS AND 
MEXICAN DTOS 
Methamphetamine use was spreading at a record pace during the early years of 
the 1990s. With “mom and pop” labs increasing throughout the country, on October 3, 
1996, President Clinton signed into law the Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control 
Act (PL 104-237), introduced by Senator Joseph Biden (D-DE).52 The purpose of this 
legislation was to broaden the controls on listed chemicals used in the production of 
methamphetamine. This involved increased penalties for the trafficking and 
manufacturing of methamphetamine and listed chemicals, and expanded the controls of 
products containing the licit chemicals ephedrine, pseudoephedrine and 
phenylpropanolamine53 However, this legislation proved to be too late. U.S. domestic 
methamphetamine production was in full swing by 1996 with the advent of Small-Toxic-
Labs (STLs), better known as “mom and pop” meth labs. To add to the meth dilemma, 
Mexican DTO controlled Super-Labs (SLs), both within the U.S. and Mexico, provided 
the bulk of methamphetamine used within the U.S. illegal drug market during this time. 
With STLs making meth popular and Mexican DTOs providing an unlimited supply, 
methamphetamine users seeking treatment more than quadrupled between 1993 and 
2003. (See Figure 3 below.) 
                                                 
52 Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Methamphetamine Facts and Figures. 
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/methamphetamine/methamphetamine_ff.html (accessed 30 
May 2008). 
53 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). The Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control Act 
of 1996, H.R. 3853. Statement of Harold D. Wankel, Chief of Operations, Drug Enforcement 
Administration, Before the House Judiciary Committee Subcommittee on Crime on 5 September 1996. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct960905.htm (accessed 30 May 2008). 
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Figure 3.   Number of Methamphetamine Admissions: 1993-2003 [From DASIS 
Report54] 
 
Even more significantly during this time, methamphetamine use spreads from a 
geographically-confined area to an epidemic that was seen by some commentators as 
having the potential to engulf over two-thirds of the nation within a ten year time-frame. 
(See Figure 4 below). The following pages of this chapter explain the role; both STLs and 








                                                 
54 Drug and Alcohol Service Information Report. The DASIS Report. 
http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/2k6/methTx/methTX.htm (accessed 6 April 2008). 
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55 U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Primary Methamphetamine Admissions by State: 
TEDS 1993-2003. http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k5TEDS/teds_03_fig8_cnt.htm (accessed on 6 May 2008). 
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1. Small-Toxic-Labs and the Spread of Meth 
Small-Toxic-Labs (STLs) or “mom and pop” meth labs are labs run by “meth 
cooks” that produce less than 10 pounds of methamphetamine in a 24-hour production 
cycle.56 According to a report produced for the U.S. Department of Justice: “STLs can 
produce methamphetamine easily and relatively cheaply.”57 During the early 1990s, 
thousands of these “mom and pop meth labs” were appearing all over the western and 
central regions of the United States. Methamphetamine production is not a difficult 
process; anyone with a basic understanding of high school chemistry can manufacture 
methamphetamine.58 In addition, there are also numerous “meth cook-books” published 
legally. A prime example is Secrets of Methamphetamine Manufacture. Now, in its sixth 
edition, this book provides recipes, pros and cons of certain types of methamphetamine 
production, lists the equipment needed for production of meth, and offers troubleshooting 
procedures for potential problems.59 In the wake of the growing popularity of the 
Internet, coupled with the easy availability of “meth cook-books”, there were over 7,000 
STLs operating within the U.S. by 2000.60 These labs were important for spreading the 
methamphetamine drug culture to regions of the U.S. that did not previously use or 
produce methamphetamine, particularly rural areas in the Midwest that had not 
traditionally been serviced by transnational drug trafficking organizations. However, they 
did not produce enough meth to feed the growing demand within the U.S. Mexican 
controlled Super-Labs, meanwhile, with their unlimited supply of oversea ephedrine were 




                                                 
56 Dana Hunt, Sarah Kuck, Linda Truitt. Methamphetamine Use: Lessons Learned. (Washington: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006), 25. www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209730.pdf (accessed 20 April 2008). 
57 Ibid., 24. 
58 Ibid., 23. 
59 Ibid. 
60 Ibid., 25. 
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2. Mexican DTO-Controlled Methamphetamine Super-Labs 
Methamphetamine Super-Labs are capable of producing more than 10 pounds of 
methamphetamine over the course of a 24-hour production cycle. 10 pounds in 24 hours 
is beyond the capacity of Small-Toxic-Labs (STLs) and, in many cases, Super-Labs could 
and can produce several hundred pounds of methamphetamine in 24 hours. Unlike the 
Small-Toxic-Labs within the U.S. that rely on over-the-counter cold medications that 
contain limited amounts of ephedrine, these industrial-style methamphetamine Super-
Labs have a large supply of the precursor chemicals at their disposal. Throughout the 
1990s, the majority of methamphetamine distributed across the U.S. was made in Super-
Labs in California. Evidence of the role of Mexican DTO-controlled Super-Labs in 
spreading methamphetamine use in the United States from 1992 to 1998 can be found in 
arrest records from that time period: 
The U.S. Sentencing Commission found that twice as many Federal 
methamphetamine cases between 1992 and 1998 involved Hispanic non-
citizens than Hispanic citizens, and Mexican nationals accounted for 93 
percent of non-citizen methamphetamine traffickers. The number of states 
convicting Mexican nationals grew from three states in 1992 to 30 states 
in 1998.61 
While the Amzecua brothers had revolutionized the meth industry in the early 
1990s with the creation of Super-Labs based in California, by the late 1990s the growing 
demand within the United States (and increased law enforcement action against meth 
production) led to another change in production methods. Mexican DTOs increasingly 
began to operate Super-Labs in Mexico. As will be made clear in Chapter IV the Super-
Labs set up in Mexico further facilitated the Mexican DTOs rise to dominance over the 
transportation to and the distribution of methamphetamine north of the border. 
F. CONCLUSION 
The growing involvement of Mexican DTOs in the methamphetamine trade, 
either by providing precursor chemicals or the operation of Super-Labs, has added a new 
                                                 
61 Dana Hunt, Sarah Kuck, Linda Truitt. Methamphetamine Use: Lessons Learned. (Washington: U.S. 
Department of Justice, 2006), 25. www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209730.pdf (accessed 20 April 2008). 
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level of organizational sophistication and scope to the methamphetamine trade. In the 
process of eventually attaining a position of dominance over the methamphetamine trade, 
the Mexican DTOs brought structure, control, and an ability to exploit new avenues for 
the distribution and consumption of methamphetamine in the United States. This chapter 
explained how they revolutionized the methamphetamine trade in the 1990s and – in 
conjunction with the spread of “mom and pop labs” -- caused methamphetamine use to 
skyrocket. The next chapter explains how Mexican DTOs surpassed the STLs to achieve 
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IV. HOW MEXICAN DRUG TRADE ORGANIZATIONS 
ACHIEVED A MONOPOLY OVER THE METHAMPHETAMINE 
TRADE 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter highlights the three main reasons Mexican DTOs were able to 
consolidate their monopoly over the burgeoning methamphetamine trade between 2003 
and 2007, becoming the “Masters of Meth”, despite an increased government response to 
the problem in the United States. First, law enforcement efforts between 1997 and 2006 
largely focused on domestic methamphetamine production, curbing the proliferation of 
the Small-Toxic-Labs (STLs). Meanwhile, operating largely free from scrutiny, Mexican 
DTOs were able to reshape production and distribution networks within the U.S. and 
maintain a constant, if not increasing, supply of meth to an every-growing market. 
Second, the increased presence of Mexican DTOs in the United States as a result of their 
expanding role in the cocaine trade throughout the 1990s and their ability to rely on 
Super-Labs operating in Mexico were key innovations. Finally, the establishment of 
Super-Labs in the Central States in 2003 allowed Mexican DTOs to make 
methamphetamine available to almost all areas of the United States by 2007. This 
combination of factors helps explain how Mexican DTOs consolidated their monopoly of 
the drug trade. It also clarifies how methamphetamine came to be perceived by state and 
local law enforcement agencies as the greatest drug threat to the U.S. population by 2005, 













Greatest Drug Threat - Percentage of State and Local Agencies Reporting 
 
Figure 5.   Greatest Drug Threat in 2005. [Source: National Drug Threat Assessment 
2005]. 
 
B. THE TOXIC MENACE: THE SMALL TOXIC LABS (STLS) 
Chapter III discussed how Small-Toxic-Labs (STLs) in the mid-1990s introduced 
meth to regions of the U.S. that had not previously used or produced methamphetamine, 
creating a market that Mexican DTOs would soon fill. This chapter describes the 
government’s response to the rise of STLs and shows how the focus on this threat 
allowed the Mexican DTOs to continue to operate and then fill the vacuum left by 
successful government efforts against the STLs.  
Rising methamphetamine use created a crisis for law enforcement agencies, not 
just because of the rising crime rate associated with the drug’s use but even more 
importantly because of the toxic nature of methamphetamine production and particularly 
the dangers of home production: As Karen Swetlow makes clear: 
The “meth cook” often handles ignitable, corrosive, reactive, and toxic 
chemicals in the presence of an open flame or heat source. Some of these 
substances are extremely harmful or lethal when inhaled or touched; others 
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react violently when they are heated, immersed in water, exposed to air, or 
combined. Although clandestine labs use a number of manufacturing 
methods, all produce volatile chemicals and toxic vapors that present 
significant health and safety hazards to the “meth cook,” children, and others 
who enter the site, including law enforcement personnel and other members 
of the first response team. Many of these chemicals are known to damage 
vital body organs or to cause cancer and other adverse health conditions.62 
STLs produce five to six pounds of hazardous waste for every one pound of meth 
produced, posing a threat to the children living in meth houses, law enforcement officers who 
are involved locating and shutting down the STLs, not to mention the broader impact on the 
environment. Again, as Swetlow points out: 
Meth labs are often found in agricultural regions, forests, and ranchland 
locations that are particularly  vulnerable to toxic waste runoff. U.S. Forest 
Service officers have encountered tree “kills” in areas surrounding STLs, and 
ranchers in Arizona have reported suspicious cattle deaths in areas 
downstream from Labs.63 
For these reasons, local law enforcement officials devoted a great deal of their 
resources to targeting “mom and pop” labs starting in 1996. Between 1997 and 2006, law 
enforcement raids on, and the elimination of, STLs grew exponentially and then fell 
dramatically. By 2005, it appeared that law enforcement had turned the corner in the battle 
against STLs. The number of Small-Toxic-Labs raided and shut down fell from 10,015 in 







                                                 
62 Karen Swetlow. “Meth Production Site: Not Really a Laboratory”, OVC Bulletin (June 2003). 
www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/pg2.html (accessed 6 March 2008). 
63 Ibid. 
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Figure 6.   Methamphetamine Lab Seizures: 1997-2006 [From NDIC 2007]. 
 
The sharp decline in the number of “mom and pop” labs operating is attributable 
in large part to a series of laws passed at the state and national level to curb the 
availability of precursor chemicals such as ephedrine and pseudo-ephedrine. The 
following laws were passed in 1993, 1996, and 2000 to combat the increasing 
methamphetamine epidemic: As DEA sources note: 
In 1993 domestic chemical control was strengthened with enactment of the 
Domestic Chemical Diversion Control Act, which added a registration 
requirement for List I chemical handlers, and removed exemptions in 
order to prevent diversion of methamphetamine precursor chemicals. 
Subsequently, Congress passed the Comprehensive Methamphetamine 
Control Act of 1996 and the Methamphetamine Anti-Proliferation Act of 
2000 to pointedly address the growing problem of clandestine 
methamphetamine production and abuse in the United States.64 
                                                 
64 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Diversion Control. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/diversion.htm (accessed 1 June 2008). 
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The restrictions placed on over-the-counter medications that contained ephedrine, 
combined with increased pressure by law enforcement agencies greatly deterred the role 
STLs played in producing methamphetamine. However, even though considerable 
progress was being made there were still thousands of STLs operating in 46 states as 
2003.65 Law enforcement agencies have and will continue to need to contend with STLs, 
not so much because of the quantity of drugs produced but rather because of the threat to 
the community their product poses. They are quite literally a ‘toxic menace’. 
The decline of STLs in the U.S. should be viewed as a tactical victory for U.S. 
law enforcement agencies. However, it should also be viewed as a strategic failure 
insofar as Mexican DTOs have easily been able to fill the void left by the thousands and 
thousands of STLs that have been dismantled. According to Dana Hunt: 
In decreasing domestic methamphetamine production through law 
enforcement pressure and strong precursor chemical sales restrictions has 
enabled Mexican DTOs to rapidly expand their control over 
methamphetamine distribution--even in eastern states--as users and 
distributors who previously produced the drug have sought new, consistent 
sources. These Mexican methamphetamine distribution groups (supported 
by increased methamphetamine production in Mexico) are often more 
difficult for local law enforcement agencies to identify, investigate, and 
dismantle because they typically are much more organized and 
experienced than local independent producers and distributors. Moreover, 
these Mexican criminal groups typically produce and distribute high purity 
methamphetamine that usually is smoked, potentially resulting in a more 
rapid onset of addiction to the drug.66 
Mexican DTOs were able to play this role in large part because of the earlier 
expansion of their drug distribution networks in the United States, associated in particular 
with cocaine since the mid-1990s. In addition, the Mexican DTOs created new Super-
Labs in the Central States and Mexico to respond to (and drive) the expanded market for 
meth in the United States. The following sections explain how these developments 
contributed to the dominance of the meth trade by Mexican DTOs, creating a market that 
                                                 
65 Hunt, Kuck, and Truitt. Methamphetamine Use. 
66 National Drug Intelligence Center. National Drug Threat Assessment 2007, (October 2006). 
http://www.justice.gov/ndic/pubs21/21137/meth.htm#Start (accessed 6 March 2008). 
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offers purer (and more harmful) drugs to users while at the same time becoming more 
resistant to domestic law enforcement efforts. 
C. “MASTERS OF METH”: MEXICAN DTOS OPERATING IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
Chapter II of this thesis outlined how the fall of the Medellin and Cali Cartels 
during the 1990s facilitated the consolidation of the Mexican DTOs role as distributors of 
cocaine within the United States. As already suggested, the Mexican DTOs achieved a 
position of unassailable dominance over the transportation and distribution of cocaine to 
the northern market, making them the COSTCO of Cocaine by the dawn of the 21st 
century. This development was further reinforced by U.S.-backed counter-drug efforts in 
Colombia that undermined any possibility, if it had ever existed that the 300 or more 
Colombian cartelitos would attempt to move beyond controlling the growth of coca and 
the production of cocaine inside Colombia. The vast majority of the cartelitos, from the 
outset, either by design, or as a result of limited power and resources, were happy to 
leave the transportation and distribution of cocaine outside of Colombia to the Mexican 
cartels. By 2005, Mexican DTOs operating in the United States vastly outnumbered 
Colombian DTOs (see Figure 7). By 2007 Mexican DTOs had achieved a position of 
superiority in both numbers and geographical reach that the Colombian, not to mention 











Areas of Influence of Drug Trafficking Organizations in the U.S. in 2005 
Figure 7.   Demographics of Foreign DTOs Operating within the U.S. in 2005. [From 
NDIC 2005]. 
 
Areas of Influence of Drug Trafficking Organizations in the U.S. in 2007 
 




As Mexican DTOs developed their drug distribution networks in the U.S. in the 1990s, 
there were increasing incentives to expand from marijuana and cocaine to meth. First, the 
expansion of the market as a result of the work of the Amzecua cartel and STLs promised 
additional profits. Second, the arrest in 1998 of the Amzecua brothers, who had 
controlled the California Super-labs, allowed an opening for other Mexican DTOs. U.S. 
law enforcement officials were reporting that at least six Mexican DTOs were involved in 
the methamphetamine trade in the U.S. by 2000. This only increased in subsequent years. 
As DEA Agent Gary Oetjen noted in a 2005 Congressional Testimony: 
The inroads and smuggling corridors which have enabled Mexican-based 
organizations to move tons of cocaine, have also enabled them to 
dominate the U.S. methamphetamine trade. Mexican criminal 
organizations control most mid-level and retail methamphetamine 
distribution in the Pacific, South-west, and West Central regions of the 
United States, as well as much of the distribution in the Great Lakes and 
Southeast regions.67 
While the spread of Mexican distribution networks is instrumental to their 
dominance of the meth trade, equally important is their continued control of meth 
production in the face of law enforcement efforts since President Clinton focused the 
country’s attention on the meth epidemic in 1996. Innovations on this front – particularly 
the establishment of Super-Labs first in the Central States and then in Mexico -- have 
guaranteed a continued supply of high purity meth to the U.S. market.  
D. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF SUPER-LABS IN THE CENTRAL STATES 
AND MEXICO 
The chart below demonstrates that Mexican-controlled Super-Labs (marked in 
red) were popping up in the Central States of the U.S. This is a noteworthy trend 
considering California had always been the epicenter of Mexican controlled Super-Labs. 
                                                 
67 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Law Enforcement and the Fight Against 
Methamphetamine: Improving Federal, State and Local Efforts. Statement of Gary W. Oetjen, Assistant 
Special Agent in Charge, Louisville District Office, Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the 
Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct082305.html (accessed 20 April 2008). 
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Primary Domestic Methamphetamine Production Areas. 
 
Figure 9.   Primary Domestic Methamphetamine Production Areas [From EPIC, 
2004]. 
 
The new dimension that these Super-Labs in the Central States add to the monopolization 
of the U.S. methamphetamine trade by the Mexican DTOs is that these Super-Labs are 
positioned around major U.S. Interstate routes. Among other things, this allows the 
Mexican DTOS to distribute a much higher purity of methamphetamine to other regions 










Mexican DTO Controlled methamphetamine Super-Labs and their Position to U.S. 
Interstates 
 
Figure 10.   Primary Domestic Methamphetamine Production Areas from 2004. EPIC 
Report Overlaid on the U.S. Interstate System [From U.S. DOT, 2008]. 
 
Positioning these Super-Labs in the Central States dramatically cuts the transport 
time from California to the Mid-West regions and into the Eastern and southeastern 
methamphetamine markets. Mexican DTOs were already situated throughout the U.S. in 
2003 as Figure 9 demonstrates. When merged with the U.S. Interstate System that is 
shown in Figure 11, the new level of sophistication that the Mexican DTOs brought to the 









Mexican DTOs and their Position In Reference to U.S. Interstates 
 
Figure 11.   Demographics of Foreign DTOs Operating within the U.S. from NDIC 
2005 compared with the U.S. Interstate System [From U.S. DOT, 2008]. 
 
In addition, Mexican DTOs began to operate Super-Labs in Mexico that could 
produce larger quantities of methamphetamine than the Super-Labs in the United States. 
Randy Weaver, a senior research specialist for the National Drug Intelligence Center 
explains the dimension these Super-Labs bring to the U.S. meth trade:  
Labs in Mexico generally produce far more methamphetamine than labs in 
the U.S., some times as much as 150 to 200 pounds per cook performed 
every other day. By contrast, Mexican organizations in the United States 
typically maintain three to seven locations that can be used as clandestine 
lab sites when necessary. Since chemicals and equipment are frequently 
removed from U.S. lab sites under Mexican control, U.S.-based cooks 
usually average only 15 pounds of methamphetamine per production 
cycle, significantly less than the operations in Mexico.68  
The increase in methamphetamine seizures on the southwest side of the U.S. 
border beginning in 2000 provides some indication of the timing of the shift to Mexican-
based Super-Labs (See Table 1 below). The ability of the Super-Labs in Mexico to 
produce both a higher volume and a greater purity of methamphetamine should be 
                                                 
68 Office of National Control Policy. Intelligence: Trafficking Organizations. Statement of Randy 
Weaver, Senior Research Specialist National Drug Intelligence Center, Before the National 
Methamphetamine Drug Conference. 
www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/drugfact/methconf/plenary4.html (accessed 10 March 2008). 
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viewed as the “pieces of the puzzle” coming together for Mexican DTOs involved in the 
methamphetamine trade. These labs provide a constant stream of meth coming into the 
U.S. and can also be viewed as providing an important contingency plan. If Mexican 
controlled Super-Labs in the U.S. are discovered and shut down by U.S. law enforcement 
agencies, the Super-Labs in Mexico would ensure the continued supply of meth into the 
U.S. 
Methamphetamine Seizures on the Southwest Border, in Kilograms, 1998-2006. 
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006  
23 0 777 1,254 1,200 1,861 2,410 2,893 2,790  
 
Table 1.   Table 1. Methamphetamine Seizures along Southwest Border [From DEA 
National Seizure System69] 
 
E.  THE “MASTERS OF METH”: THE MONOPOLY OF THE METH 
TRADE BY MEXICAN DTOS 
The ability of Mexican DTOs to expand their distribution networks and create 
new Super-Labs in the Central States and Mexico that guaranteed a secure supply of 
methamphetamine allowed them to establish their control over new meth markets 
originally created by the mushrooming of “mom and pop” labs. Once the latter meth labs 
were brought under control by 2005, Mexican DTOs were already well positioned to fill 
the gap in the market and expand it further. This section documents the increased 
monopolization of the meth market by the Mexican cartels in four different regions of the 
U.S. between 2003 and 2007. These include the Western states of Colorado, Wyoming, 
and Utah; the mid-western state of Oklahoma; the South-eastern states of Kentucky and 
Louisiana; and the Eastern state of Pennsylvania. These states were chosen as examples 
for two reasons. First, they demonstrate the role Mexican DTOs played in these States 
before 2003. Second, they demonstrate how over a five-year time frame Mexican DTOs 
monopolized the meth market within these regions. 
 
                                                 
69 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. National Seizure System. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/meth.htm#Table11 (accessed 1 May 2008). 
  51
1. Mexican Mastery of the Meth Trade in the Western U.S. 
According to the DEA State Fact-sheet for 2003, the methamphetamine drug trade 
in Colorado was fueled by “locally produced methamphetamine of a higher potency than 
that imported from Mexico”. In the first few years of the 21st century, DEA laboratory 
analysis “found that the overall purity levels of Mexican-produced methamphetamine 
dropped significantly.”70 This had all changed by 2007. As the DEA notes: 
Most of the methamphetamine available in Colorado originates in 
California and Mexico. In recent years, the potency of methamphetamine 
produced in Mexico has risen to levels comparable to that made in 
smaller, local clandestine labs. While clandestine laboratories remain 
problematic to law enforcement in Colorado, the number of such 
laboratories has diminished dramatically. This is possibly due to the 
increasing supply of Mexican-produced methamphetamine.71 
According to DEA Fact Sheets for Wyoming, meanwhile, meth produced by STLs was 
the greatest illicit drug threat in the state in 2003. In that year it was reported that: 
Meth remains the largest drug threat throughout Wyoming, and 
methamphetamine arrests exceed arrests for all other drugs. Clandestine 
methamphetamine laboratory seizures also increased during the last two 
fiscal years.72 
The report also indicates that “Mexican illegal aliens” had begun increasing their 
involvement in the meth trade in 2000 but had not surpassed the STLs. By the end of 
2007, however, the DEA concluded that: “Mexican poly-drug trafficking organizations 
dominate the distribution of methamphetamine in Wyoming.”73 
In 2003, the DEA field office in Utah noted that “methamphetamine remains the 
largest drug threat throughout Utah, though several favorable indicators are emerging”. 
                                                 
70 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheet.(2003). 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/colorado2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
71 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/colorado2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
72 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/wyoming2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
73 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/wyoming2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
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The DEA spoke in particularly positive terms about the fact that the “number of 
methamphetamine laboratories seized by law enforcement in Utah dropped by 29 
percent” between 2001 and 2003.74 By 2007, however, the Mexican DTOs dominated all 
facets of illegal narcotics distribution throughout Utah.  
Sources of supply for meth, cocaine, heroin, and marijuana are primarily 
located in Mexico, California, the Southwest, and Pacific Northwest. 
Methamphetamine trafficking and abuse are the primary drug threats in 
Utah.75 
2. Mexican Mastery of the Meth Trade in the Midwestern U.S. 
The same story that unfolded in the western states between 2003 and 2007 holds true 
for the Midwest region. In 2003, the DEA field office in Oklahoma noted that the “small 
‘mom and pop’ or STLs continue to be a significant problem throughout Oklahoma.”76 By 
2007, however, “methamphetamine from Mexico continues to be the primary drug of choice 
(other than marijuana) in Oklahoma.”77 Also of particular interest, the Oklahoma DEA field 
office noted that “Oklahoma also serves as a transshipment point for drugs” headed “to the 
eastern United States via Interstates 40 and 44. Interstate 35 also provides a critical north-
south transportation avenue for drug traffickers.”78 Notably, Interstate 35 connects the four 
Mexican DTO-controlled Super-Labs identified in Figure 8. 
3. Mexican Mastery of the Meth Trade in the Southeastern U.S. 
In order to explain the Mexican DTOs control of the meth trade in the Southeast, this 
section will explore the methamphetamine trade in Kentucky and Louisiana, and compare 
2003 with 2007. With regard to Kentucky in 2003, the DEA field office reported that: 
                                                 
74 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/utah2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
75 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/utah2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
76 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/oklahoma2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
77 Ibid. 
78 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/oklahoma2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
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Kentucky methamphetamine production is a simple process taught among 
violators and dominated by Caucasians in the lower social and economic 
class, including former marijuana cultivators, who are beginning to realize 
the greater profit margin and diminished threat from law enforcement 
posed by methamphetamine production versus marijuana cultivation.79 
By 2007, this had changed considerably. STLs were declining in number but Mexican 
DTOs had moved to maintain and/or increase the availability of methamphetamine: 
Although, as the DEA noted “methamphetamine manufacturing activity in Kentucky has 
decreased, the supply of methamphetamine is supported by an increase in the distribution 
of methamphetamine by Mexican drug trafficking organizations.”80 
The Louisiana DEA field office states that in 2003, STLs posed the greatest threat 
to local law enforcement agencies. However, this same report indicates the ability of 
Mexican DTOs to exploit the Interstate system (I-10, I-12, I-20 for the East/West route 
and I-55 for the North/South route): 
Overland transportation utilizing private and commercial vehicles 
continues to be the most commonly encountered smuggling method in 
Louisiana. Elevated security due to the September 11th tragedy has 
deterred transportation of most drugs via commercial air travel. Mexican 
traffickers traveling to and from Miami, Houston, or the South-west 
Border via I-10, I-12, I-20 (East / West routes) and Interstate 55 (North / 
South route) are largely responsible for the transportation and distribution 
of methamphetamine into Louisiana.81  
By 2007, the same DEA field office reported that “most of the methamphetamine 
available in Louisiana is transported into Louisiana via Mexican DTOs.”82 The case of 
Louisiana’s meth trade should be viewed as a prime example of the Mexican DTOs 
continued success in staying ahead of law enforcement tactics. During this five-year 
                                                 
79 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/oklahoma2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
80 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/kentucky2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
81 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/louisiana2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
82 Ibid. 
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period, law enforcement agencies were never able to significantly curb the flow of meth 
to this region via the distribution network controlled by the Mexican DTOs. 
4. The Growing Presence of Mexican DTOs in the Eastern U.S. 
Although methamphetamine has not penetrated the East Coast in the same way as 
the other regions of the U.S., the trends are similar in terms of increased Mexican DTO 
dominance of the market. In Pennsylvania in 2003, for example, the methamphetamine 
market was still dominated by local producers and Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs (OMGs). 
According to the DEA field office: 
Investigations indicated that most of the methamphetamine consumed in 
the division originated in south-eastern Pennsylvania (Philadelphia and its 
surrounding counties). There, independent traffickers and members of 
outlaw motorcycle gangs have dominated manufacturing, trafficking, and 
distribution of methamphetamine.83  
Fast-forward to 2007, and the DEA is singing a very different song. First they reported 
that “methamphetamine and crystal methamphetamine abuse and trafficking remained a 
significant problem, as evidenced by an increase in new crystal methamphetamine 
investigations and a substantial increase in overall methamphetamine seizures from fiscal 
year 2004 to present.”84 Second, and most significantly, they reported that “most of the 
trafficking and distribution of methamphetamine was facilitated by a variety of Hispanic 
networks that are scattered throughout the state.”85 In sum, as the DEA notes, Mexican 
methamphetamine distribution networks have drastically changed the methamphetamine 
industry within the U.S. 
Mexican methamphetamine distribution networks have supplanted many 
local midlevel and retail dealers in areas of the Great Lakes, Pacific, 
Southeast, Southwest, and West Central Regions. Mexican DTOs have 
expanded their methamphetamine distribution networks, particularly in 
methamphetamine markets previously supplied by local distributors. Law 
                                                 
83 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/pennsylvania2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
84 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets. 
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/pennsylvania2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
85 Ibid. 
  55
enforcement authorities in cities, including Akron (OH), Hannibal (MO), 
Dallas and Houston (TX), Mobile (AL), Nashville (TN), Oklahoma City 
(OK), Orlando and Tampa (FL), Pueblo (CO), and Richmond and 
Shenandoah (VA), report the growing prevalence of Mexican DTOs at all 
levels of methamphetamine distribution in their areas and a concurrent 
increase in the availability of ice methamphetamine. Furthermore, law 
enforcement reporting indicates that in some cities--including Los 
Angeles, Chicago, Dallas and Fort Worth (TX), Memphis and Nashville 
(TN), and Oklahoma City--Mexican DTOs are exploiting their 
relationships with Hispanic and African American gangs as a means of 
controlling methamphetamine distribution at the midlevel and retail 
level.86 
As a result, in 2007 -- for the third year in a row -- state and local law enforcement 
agencies reported methamphetamine to be the greatest drug threat facing their area. 
                                                 
86 U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. National Seizure System. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/meth.htm#Table11 (accessed 1 May 2008). 
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National Drug Threat Survey from 2007  
 
Figure 12.   Greatest Drug Threat as reported by State and Local Agencies [NDIC, 
2007]. 
 
F. CONCLUSION: FROM THE COSTCO OF COCAINE TO THE 
MASTERS OF METH 
This chapter explained how the growing rise of Small-Toxic-Labs (STLs) starting 
in 1997 and reaching their climax in 2003 with over 10,000 labs located in 46 states 
within the U.S., forced law enforcement agencies on to the offensive. However, at the 
same time as these law enforcement agencies were making headway in deterring 
domestic methamphetamine production, Mexican DTOs were gaining the upper hand. 
First, the Mexican cartels were already expanding their distribution power by replacing 
Colombian DTOs control of the cocaine trade. Second, the Mexican DTOs set up Super-
Labs in Mexico, California, and the Central States. This provided a three key production 
sites that, when combined with the Mexican DTOs existing distribution networks, 
dramatically altered the structure of the U.S. methamphetamine market. Between 2003 
and 2007 the Mexican DTOs gained a virtual monopoly of the production and 
distribution of methamphetamine in the United States. For the first time in the decades 
long “War on Drugs,” the U.S. finds itself sharing a 2,000 mile long border with the 
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country where the region’s most powerful drug cartels are based. As the first decade of 
the 21st century comes to a close the vast majority of cocaine and methamphetamine 
being consumed in the United States enters the country under the auspices of the four 
main Mexican-based cartels. These large and increasingly powerful criminal 
organizations not only dominate the drug trade in Mexico and into the United States, but 
have also become the most powerful drug cartels in the Americas as a whole. This poses 
a new set of challenges and responsibilities for the governments of Mexico and the 
United States. The story of how we got here has now been told, but in the telling the scale 
and scope of the problem has become clear. What has also become clear is that we have 
not been here before and if the challenge is going to be met, new tactics and new 

































The purpose of this thesis was to tell the untold story of the ascendance of 
Mexican DTOs over the production and distribution of methamphetamine. By adding this 
dimension to a story that has typically focused on the role of Mexican DTOs in the 
cocaine trade, the thesis explains the spread of meth use in the U.S. and the challenges 
currently facing U.S. law enforcement officials attempting to combat the illegal 
methamphetamine trade. This concluding chapter summarizes the main findings and 
assesses their implications for government efforts to combat contemporary drug 
trafficking in the Americas. 
A. IMPLICATIONS FOR THE U.S. 
A reoccurring theme was that Mexican DTOs have brought complexity, structure, 
and sophistication to the illegal drug trade, particularly to the production and distribution 
of methamphetamine. Chapter II explained how Mexican DTOs capitalized on their 
proximity to the U.S., the implementation of NAFTA in 1994, and their access to corrupt 
Mexican law enforcement officials and politicians to develop major supply routes to 
Colombian produced cocaine to market in the United States. Over time, Mexican DTOs 
increasingly displaced Colombian DTOs, until the latter were confined to the growth of 
coca and production of cocaine in Colombia, while the former monopolized 
transportation and distribution. This shift was due in part to increasing government 
pressure, first on the Medellin and Cali Cartels, and later on the Colombian cartelitos that 
emerged in the wake of the collapse of the two main Colombian DTOs in 1993 and 1995 
respectively. Utilizing their experience of smuggling marijuana and heroin into the U.S. 
and relying on Mexican immigrant communities in the U.S., Mexican DTOs restructured 
and redefined the way cocaine was delivered to the American market. Their geographical 
reach within the United States today far surpasses that of the Colombian cartels even in 
the latter’s heyday in the 1980s. 
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Chapter III explained how Mexican DTOs utilized the foundation of their 
monopolization of the cocaine trade to underpin the export of methamphetamine 
precursor chemicals to the meth producers in the United States. During the 1980s and 
early 1990s, Mexican DTOs shifted from acting as the suppliers of precursor chemicals to 
hands-on methamphetamine producers, revolutionizing the production of the drug 
through the use of Super-Labs. The involvement of Mexican DTOs not only drove down 
prices and increased the availability of methamphetamine, but has added a level of 
organizational sophistication, and scope that was not the case before their ascension. The 
Mexican cartels, having become the COSTCO of Cocaine, revolutionized the 
methamphetamine trade in the 1990s and – in conjunction with the rise and decline of 
“mom and pop labs” – ensured that methamphetamine use spread from Western states 
eastward, making the Mexican cartels the “Masters of Meth” in the process. 
Chapter IV explained how U.S. law enforcement efforts between 1997 and 2006 
largely focused on domestic methamphetamine production, particularly trying to curb the 
proliferation of the Small-Toxic-Labs (STLs). In this period, meanwhile, Mexican DTOs, 
were able to reshape the production and distribution networks in the U.S. and maintain a 
constant, if not increasing, supply of meth to an every-growing market. The increased 
presence of Mexican DTOs in the United States as a result of their expanding role in the 
cocaine trade throughout the 1990s and their subsequent ability to rely on Super-Labs 
operating in the Central States and Mexico to meet the growing demand for 
methamphetamine were key innovations. The establishment of Super-Labs in the Central 
States in 2003 allowed Mexican DTOs to make methamphetamine widely available in 
almost all areas of the United States by 2007. Super-Labs based in Mexico were also 
established during this time. While they presented greater transportation challenges, 
given that they were south of the border, they could produce meth in much larger 
quantities than U.S.-based labs. The combination of the above factors helps explain how 
Mexican DTOs consolidated their monopoly of the drug trade, particularly cocaine and 
methamphetamine. It also makes clear why by 2005, methamphetamine had come to be 
perceived by state and local law enforcement agencies in the United States as the greatest 
drug threat to the general population. 
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The following quote describes how the Mexican DTOs have changed the 
methamphetamine trade and the new challenges that they pose: 
Mike McDonald, a drug-control detective in Jasper County, MO states 
“there’s a lot of money in the Mexican meth trade.”87 “These Mexican 
cartels can afford surveillance systems. They can afford body armor. They 
can afford weapons. And we are seeing more and more of that now.”88  
Mexican DTOs being highly armed and capable of posing a serious threat to U.S. 
law enforcement officials brings a new dynamic to the meth trade. Since Mexican DTOs 
outnumber any other DTO within the U.S. and they control literally every facet of the 
methamphetamine market, violence is sure to erupt if U.S. law enforcement agencies or 
other DTOs challenge them from Asia, Russia, or Jamaica.  
B.  IMPLICATIONS FOR MEXICO 
As mentioned at the outset, the United Nations (UN) estimates that Mexican drug-
lords control a USD$ 142 billion a year business in cocaine, heroin, marijuana, 
methamphetamine, and other illicit drugs.89 With this much revenue, Mexican DTOs can 
and do fight back when the Mexican government threatens their control of this multi-
billion dollar industry. As The Christian Science Monitor reported recently: 
Seven federal police officers were killed in Culiacán during a gun battle 
with three men working for a drug cartel, the police said. The officers 
were the latest victims in a conflict between the cartels and the police that 
has claimed the lives of more than 30 federal agents and 170 local police 
officers in the last 18 months.90  
The rise of drug-related violence had led many Mexican citizens to question if Mexican 
authorities can control the drug cartels. The Mexican newspaper, Reforma, says a 
                                                 
87U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. National Seizure System. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/meth.htm#Table11 (accessed 1 May 2008). 
88Ibid. 
89 “Mexico: Drug Cartels a Growing Threat.” Worldpress.org, 25 June 2007, 
http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2549.cfm (accessed 10 June 2008). 
90 “Mexico Drug Violence Intensifies.” The Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 2008, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0602/p99s01-duts.html (accessed 5 June 2008). 
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"majority of Mexicans believe the government is losing its escalating battle against drug 
gangs.”91 According to a poll published in this same paper, reports indicate "some 53 
percent of Mexicans surveyed by the newspaper said cartels are defeating security forces 
engaged in a nationwide crackdown. Only 24 percent said the government is winning, 
and 23 percent had no opinion."92  
The Mexican DTOs have enormous resources, which they have used over many 
years to corrupt and intimidate the police (who, at the local and municipal level in the key 
border states are already on the payroll of the cartels). They function above the law and 
continue to grow in power. “Turf Wars” have also emerged between competing Mexican 
DTOs for drug corridors and illegal points of entry into the U.S. In May of 2008, battles 
broke out in Culiacan between rival gangs working for competing DTOs. They engaged 
in machine-gun fire and grenade throwing.93 Meanwhile, assassins hired by the Sinaloan 
Cartel killed one of Mexico's top federal police officers.94 By 2008 Mexican DTOs had 
risen to the position of “States within a State”. Serious questions need to be asked about 
the Mexican government’s ability to curb the power of the Mexican cartels. And even if 
the central government was able to rein in the power of the Mexican DTOs, and even 
wind back the quantity of drugs flowing into the United States, it would at best be a 
temporary fix.  
C. THE BALLOON EFFECT: THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF 
SUCCESSFUL ACTION AGAINST MEXICAN DTOS 
As this thesis has shown, drug control efforts often achieve tactical successes and 
strategic failures. Success on one front, leads to the discovery that drug trafficking has 
merely shifted to a new venue or been taken over by a different organization. This is 
commonly referred to as the “balloon effect”: 
                                                 
91“Mexico Drug Violence Intensifies.” The Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 2008, 
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The drug trade a is balloon you can never bust, only squeeze. The problem 
with squeezing the balloon is that it expands in areas where there is no 
pressure. This is the case with the Latin American drug industry, it 
expands where there is no pressure, and since you can never destroy it, it 
takes new form when pressure is exerted.95  
The fall of the Medellin and Cali cartels, for example, led to their replacement by 
Mexican DTOs. Similarly, in the methamphetamine trade, the arrest of the Amzecua 
brothers in 1998 -- who had pioneered Super -Labs in California and revolutionized the 
U.S. meth industry – simply paved the way for l other Mexican DTOs to expand their 
role in the meth trade. Meanwhile, successful law enforcement efforts against “mom and 
pop” labs also allowed Mexican DTOs unimpeded access to a new base of users. The 
governments of the U.S. and Mexico should expect any successful efforts against current 
Mexican DTOs to have similar consequences. It is possible that small, more independent, 
discrete, and commercially sophisticated organizations will emerge to fill any void 
created by the collapse of the ruling cartels in Mexico. This will create a restructuring of 
power and control within the U.S./Mexico drug industry and the effects will pose serious 
problems for law enforcement agencies, because these new cartels will be more refined, 
harder to track, and incorporate tactics that will keep them ahead of current law 
enforcement tactics. In addition, successful efforts against Mexican DTOs are likely only 
to lead to increased DTO activity in other countries. Government officials must pay 
attention not only to the “spillover” of the drug trade into Central American countries, 
especially Guatemala, but also the return of the drug trade to the Caribbean. There are 
indications that the Colombian cartelitos are already seeking to increase their profits by 
shifting away from partnerships with Mexican DTOs that charge a 50 percent 
commission in kind to dealing with Dominican traffickers who charge a more reasonable 
20 percent. Since at least 2006, increased drug flights have been recorded through  
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Venezuela and into the Dominican Republic.96 This trend will only be encouraged to the 
extent that drug control efforts in Mexico are successful – and the Caribbean continues to 
be ignored. 
If specific measures against Mexican DTO participation in the meth trade are 
successful – for example, limits on ephedrine importation into Mexico and attacks on 
Super-Labs operating within Mexico – the United States should not expect to see a 
decline in the meth trade within the United States. Instead, it is likely that this will open 
the door for Asian-based DTOs. Mexican DTOs have achieved a virtual-monopoly of the 
U.S. methamphetamine trade. However, when compared to the world methamphetamine 
market, Asian countries such as China, Thailand, Taiwan, and the Republic of the 
Philippines account for 80 percent of the total world-wide seizures of this illegal drug, 
compared to 2 percent for Mexico (See Figure 13). 
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Reported Seizures of Methamphetamine by Country: 2000-2001. 
 
Figure 13.   Seizures of Methamphetamine by Country.97]  
 
The demise of Mexican DTOs would be akin to the fall of the Medellin and Cali 
Cartels. This would send shock waves through the meth industry and leave Asian DTOs 
well positioned to take control of this market due to their unlimited supply of meth from 
their source countries. Although China, Thailand, and Taiwan do not share a border with 
the U.S., they are huge trading partners and this will allow them to easily mask the 
exportation of methamphetamine under the blanket of free trade, just like NAFTA does 
for Latin American cocaine and Mexican methamphetamine. Also, Asian DTOs could 
easily assume the role of methamphetamine middlemen that supply Mexican DTOs 
within the U.S., this is the same role Mexican DTOs occupied when they supplied the 
Outlaw Motorcycle Gangs in the early and mid 1980s. According to the DEA, Asian 
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DTOs already control a large portion of the heroin trade within the U.S. For example, 
they use the port of New York as a major staging area.98 If Mexican DTOs lose their hold 
on the U.S. meth market, Asian DTOs could quickly fill the vacuum by switching their 
product line to include methamphetamine produced in Asia. If this sounds familiar, this is 
the same scenario that occurred in the 1980s when Mexican DTOs switched from 
marijuana to cocaine. This switching of products also occurred again in the 1990s when 
Mexican DTO shifted from cocaine to methamphetamine.  
The proposed Merida Initiative, a combined effort by the U.S., Mexican and 
Central American governments to combat drug trafficking in the region, must take these 
issues into account. To support this initiative, President Bush in October of 2007 sent a 
request to the U.S. Congress asking for USD$ 500 million dollars in supplemental aid for 
2008 as part of a USD$ 1.4 billion dollar multi-year package to help Mexico fight its war 
on illegal drugs.99 Congress seems to understand some of the lessons, increasing the 
share of money in the plan directed toward Central America. If the Merida Initiative (the 
June 2008 version of which has been formally rejected by the Mexican government; 
however, it is clear the debate is not over) were to produce results akin to Plan Colombia, 
this would simply create new challenges. The trick, as it were, is to formulate 
international anti-drug policy that incorporates the “balloon effect” and anticipates the 
creation of a new challenge even as the old one is being laid low. If nothing else, the 
untold story of how the Mexican cartels rose to monopolize the methamphetamine trade 
in the United States demonstrates that the formulation of anti-drug policy needs to bridge 
the gap between tactical success and strategic failure. Drug lords come and drug lords go 
but the war on drugs goes on.  If real progress is to be made, then the specifics, such as 
the story of how the Mexican DTOs took over the methamphetamine trade needs to be 
told and retold and integrated into the broader anti-drug policy initiative of the day. 
 
 
                                                 
98 Drug Trafficking In The United States. Almanac of Policy Issues. 
http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/drug_trafficking.shtml (accessed 27 May 2008). 
99 Foreign Policy In Focus. Plan Mexico. http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4684 (accessed 6 March 2007). 
  67
LIST OF REFERENCES 
Bowden, Mark. Killing Pablo: The Hunt for the World’s Greatest Outlaw. New York, 
NY: Atlantic Monthly Press, 2001. 
Clawson, Patrick L. and Lee, R. W. The Andean Cocaine Industry. New York: St. 
Martin’s Press, 1996. 
Collett, Merril The Cocaine Connection: Drug Trafficking and Inter-American Relations. 
New York: Foreign Policy Association Press Inc, 1989.  
DEA History, 1985-1990. http://www.deamuseum.org/dea_history_book/1985_1990.htm 
(accessed on 25 May 2008). 
DEA History Book 1994-1998. http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/history/1994-1998.html 
(accessed 4 April 2008). 
Drug and Alcohol Service Information Report. The DASIS Report. 
http://www.drugabusestatistics.samhsa.gov/2k6/methTx/methTX.htm (accessed 6 
April 2008). 
Drug Trafficking In The United States. Almanac of Policy Issues. 
http://www.policyalmanac.org/crime/archive/drug_trafficking.shtml (accessed 27 
May 2008). 
Embassy of Colombia. Plan Colombia: The Roadmap for Peace. 
http://www.colombiacmb.org/opencm/opencms/plancolombia.html (accessed 16 
December 2007). 
Frontline. “The Meth Epidemic.” Public Broadcasting Service (PBS). 
www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/meth/etc/cron.html (accessed 6 March 2008). 
Forero, Juan. “Venezuela Increasingly A Conduit For Cocaine.” Washington Post, 28 
October 2007, http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2007/10/27/AR2007102701426.html (accessed 30 May 2008). 
Foreign Policy In Focus. “Plan Mexico.” http://www.fpif.org/fpiftxt/4684 (accessed 6 
March 2007). 
Giraldo, Jeanne. Professor at the Naval Postgraduate School (NPS). Interview by author, 
8 April 2008, Monterey, CA. 
Griffith, Ivelaw L. Drugs and Security in the Caribbean. University Park, PA: 
Pennsylvania State University Press, 1997.  
  68
Hunt, Dana, Kuck, Sarah, and Truitt, Linda. Methamphetamine Use: Lessons Learned. 
U.S. Department of Justice, 2006. www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/grants/209730.pdf 
(accessed 20 April 2008). 
International Crisis Group. War and Drugs in Colombia. Latin American Report Number 
11. 27 January 2005. 
Jannol, Rebecca and Meyers, Deborah. U.S.-Canada-Mexico Fact Sheet on Trade and 
Migration. Migration Policy Institute, Washington, D.C., November 2003. 
Lupsha, Peter. Transnational Narco-Corruption and Narco-Investment: A Focus on 
Mexico. 
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/mexico/readings/lupsha.html. 
Marcella, Gabriel. Implementing Plan Colombia: Some Differing Perspectives. 
Washington, D.C. The Strategic Studies Institute, 2001. 
“Mexico: Drug Cartels a Growing Threat.” Worldpress.org, 25 June 2007, 
http://www.worldpress.org/Americas/2549.cfm (accessed 10 June 2008). 
‘Mexico Drug Violence Intensifies,” The Christian Science Monitor, 2 June 2008, 
http://www.csmonitor.com/2008/0602/p99s01-duts.html (accessed 5 June 2008). 
“Mexican ‘Ice’ Replaces Home-Cooked Meth in U.S.” National Public Radio, 22 April 
2008, http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=9193186 (accessed 
10 May 2008). 
Meyer, Maureen. At a Crossroads: Drug Trafficking, Violence and the Mexican State. 
Washington D.C. Office on Latin America (WOLA), 2007. 
http://www.wola.org/index.php?option=com_content&id=594&Itmid=8 
(accessed 2 March 2008). 
Office of National Control Policy. Intelligence: Trafficking Organizations. Statement of 
Randy Weaver, Senior Research Specialist National Drug Intelligence Center, 
before the National Methamphetamine Drug Conference. 
www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/drugfact/methconf/plenary4.html 
(accessed 10 March 2008). 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). Methamphetamine Facts and Figures.  
http://www.whitehousedrugpolicy.gov/drugfact/methamphetamine/methampheta
mine_ff.html (accessed 30 May 2008). 
Office of National Drug Control Policy (ONDCP). National Drug Control Strategy 2000 
Annual Report. 
http://www.ncjrs.gov/ondcppubs/publications/policy/ndcs00/chap2_5.html 
(accessed 6 March 2008). 
  69
Prillaman, William C. Crime, Democracy, and Development in Latin America, CSIS: 
Policy Papers on the Americas XIV, Study 6, June 2003. 
Report to Congress Requesters. U.S.-Mexico Border: Issues and Challenges Confronting 
the United States and Mexico. 12 July 1999. 
Swetlow, Karen. OVC Bulletin. Meth Production Site: Not Really a Laboratory, June 
2003.    www.ojp.usdoj.gov/ovc/publications/bulletins/children/pg2.html 
(accessed 6 March 2008). 
Toro, Maria C. Mexico’s “War” on Drugs: Causes and Consequences. Boulder: Lynne 
Rienner Publishing, 1995. 
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Judiciary. Border Protection, Antiterrorism, and 
Illegal Immigration Control Act 2005. 109th Congress 2006. pp 109-345. 
United States Department of Agriculture. North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)http://www.fas.usda.gov/itp/Policy/NAFTA/nafta.asp (accessed 20 
January 2008). 
U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. Primary Methamphetamine Admissions 
by State: TEDS 1993-2003. 
http://www.oas.samhsa.gov/2k5TEDS/teds_03_fig8_cnt.htm (accessed on 6 May 
2008). 
U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center: National Drug Threat 
Assessment 2007. December  2006. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs21/21137/dtos.htm (accessed on 1 March 2007). 
U.S. Department of Justice. National Drug Intelligence Center: National Drug Threat 
Assessment 2008. October 2007. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/ndic/pubs25/25921/sumary.htm#Top (accessed on  2 March 
2008). 
U.S. Department of State. Bureau of Western Hemisphere Affairs: Plan Colombia. 
Washington D.C. March 14, 2001 
http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/fs/2001/1042.htm (accessed 16 November 2007). 
U.S. Department of State. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) for 
2002. http://www.state.gov/p/inl/rls/nrcrpt/2002/html/17944.htm (accessed on 30 
May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Diversion Control. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/programs/diversion.htm (accessed 1 June 2008). 
  70
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Facing the Methamphetamine Problem in the 
United States. Statement of Rogelio E. Guevara, Chief of Operations, Drug 
Enforcement Administration, Before the House Committee on Government 
Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct040803.html (accessed 20 April 
2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Law Enforcement and the Fight Against 
Methamphetamine: Improving Federal, State and Local Efforts. Statement of 
Gary W. Oetjen, Assistant Special Agent in Charge, Louisville District Office, 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the Committee on Government Reform 
Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug Policy and Human Resources. 
http://www.justice.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct082305.html (accessed 20 April 
2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. National Seizure System. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/concern/meth.htm#Table11 (accessed 1 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.      
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/colorado2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.           
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/colorado2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.         
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/kentucky2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.          
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/kentucky2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.          
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/louisiana2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.          
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/louisiana2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.        
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/oklahoma2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.         
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/oklahoma2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2005). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.            
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/pennsylvania2003.html (accessed on 15 May 
2008). 
  71
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.     
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/pennsylvania2007.html (accessed on 15 May 
2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.     
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/pennsylvania2007.html (accessed on 15 May 
2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.     
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/wyoming2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.      
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/wyoming2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.       
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/utah2003.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. State Factsheets.       
http://www.dea.gov/pubs/states/utah2007.html (accessed on 15 May 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Statement of Thomas A. Constantine, 
Administrator, Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the Senate Foreign 
Relations Committee on 8 August 1995. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct950808.htm (accessed 20 April 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. Statement of Sandalio Gonzalez, Special Agent 
in Charge El Paso Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the House 
Committee on Government Reform Subcommittee on Criminal Justice, Drug 
Policy and Human Resources on 15 April 2003. 
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct041503.html  (accessed 20 April 2008). 
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration. The Comprehensive Methamphetamine Control 
Act of 1996, H.R. 3853. Statement of Harold D. Wankel, Chief of Operations, 
Drug Enforcement Administration, Before the House Judiciary Committee 
Subcommittee on Crime on 5 September 1996.  
http://www.usdoj.gov/dea/pubs/cngrtest/ct960905.htm (accessed 30 May 2008). 
United States Government Accountability Office. Drug Control: Revised Drug 
Interdiction Approach Is Needed in Mexico. Report to the Chairman and Ranking 
Minority Member, Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives on 8 
May 1993. http://archive.gao.gov/t2pbat5/149222.pdf  (accessed on 28 April 
2008). 
  72
United States Government Accountability Office. Drug Control: U.S. Assistance Has 
Helped Mexican Counter-narcotics Efforts, but the Flow of Illegal Drugs into the 
Unites States Remains High. Statement of Jess T. Ford, Director of International 
Affairs and Trade, Before the Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere, 
Committee on Foreign Affairs House of Representatives on 25 October 2007. 
http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d08215t.pdf (accessed on 28 April 2008). 
“Violence Erupts in Mexico’s Heartland,” Reuters, 20 May 2008, 
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/24726572/ (accessed  5 June 2008). 
  73
INITIAL DISTRIBUTION LIST 
1. Defense Technical Information Center 
Fort Belvoir, VA 
 
2. Dudley Know Library  
Naval Postgraduate School 
Monterey, CA 
 
 
